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INTRODUCTION

) FWar,all theThucydides
characters in the massive landscape of the Peloponnesian
singles out Themistocles as one who "beyond all
others deserves our admiration."' "Without studying a subject in advance or deliberating over it later... [Themistocles] had the power to
reach the right conclusion in matters that have to be settled on the spur
of the moment and do not admit of long discussions . . . ."I "He was
particularly remarkable at looking into the future and seeing there the
hidden possibilities for good or evil," and "his forecasts of the future
were always more reliable than those of others."' Not only could he
concretely explain all he knew, but his judgment was such that "even
outside his own department he was still capable of giving an excellent
opinion."4 In sum, "this man was supreme at doing precisely the right
thing at precisely the right moment."5
To do precisely the right thing at precisely the right moment: what
more could a client want from a lawyer, and what more could legal education hope to teach? But so many lawyers lack the decisiveness and
* Copyright 1989, 1990 Richard K. Neumann, Jr. All

rights reserved.

** Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A. 1969, Po-

mona College; Diploma 1971, University of Stockholm; J.D. 1975, American University;
LL.M. 1978, Temple University. The author is grateful for the comments and suggestions of Deborah A. Ezbitski, Eric Freedman, Jon Hyman, Stefan Krieger, Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ralph Stein, Roy Stuckey, and generally the participants of the 1989
UCLA-Warwick International Clinical Scholarship Conference, where a draft of this article was presented.
1. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War Book I, 0138 (R.Warner trans.
1954).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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presence of mind to make wise decisions "on the spur of the moment";
they disregard "the hidden possibilities for good or evil"; their predictions of the future are wrong more often than need be; and they do not
have the feel for a situation's inner logic that would enable them to act
astutely when few facts are available. They lack, in other words, what
Thucydides found in Themistocles: the ability to create a strategy that
will cause things to happen.
Strategy is the design of conflict. 6 It is not the provocation of conflict,
for that might not be of the lawyer's or the client's choosing. Rather,
once the potential for hostility arises, strategy is the process of structuring the conflict around the means for winning it. Strategizing is the most
central lawyering skill: even the most placid office lawyer-doing little
more than drafting instruments-cannot be effective unless all the conflicts that might later grow out of a will or contract are strategized in
advance through the document itself.
Tactics are a smaller matter-more limited in effect, simpler to explain
and more easily understood. A tactic is "an application of strategy on a
lower plane," 7 or, conversely, a strategy is a design composed of a mosaic
of tactics. 8 A staged anger display in negotiation is a tactic. A systematic plan for demoralizing a negotiation adversary over a period of weeks
is a strategy. Not only is a random collection of tactics not a strategy,
but a tactic that is part of a well-designed strategy is far more likely to
have an effect than one that is not. And the most effective process of
planning creates an overall strategy and then furnishes it with tactics.
This Article is the first exploration in the legal literature of the process
of creating strategy (Part IA), of the effect of temperament on strategy
(Part IB), and of the ways in which strategy is learned and most effectively taught (Part II). Part III considers some moral problems raised by
both strategic instrumentalism and law school teaching heavily flavored
with it. Because strategic creativity in law has not been rigorously studied, this Article necessarily draws on insights from other fields. Part II,
in particular, does not and cannot ultimately resolve all the questions it
raises, because strategizing is not merely the most essential lawyering
skill: it is also among the most difficult to teach. Much further inquiry
will be needed before the pedagogy that most effectively imparts it is fully
understood.
6. See B. Liddell Hart, Strategy 338 (2d ed. 1967).
7. Id. at 335.
8. This distinction between strategy and tactics is generally accepted both in the
literature on lawyering and in the literature on war. See K. von Clausewitz, On War 128
(M. Howard & P. Paret transl. 1976); D. Gifford, Legal Negotiation: Theory and Applications 25-43 (1989); B. Liddell Hart, supra note 6, at 335; S.Morison, Strategy and
Compromise 4 (1958); Fisher & Siegel, EvaluatingNegotiation Behaviorand Results: Can
We Identify What We Say We Know?, 36 Cath. U.L. Rev. 395, 418-20 (1987).
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A.

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

The Process of Strategy

Luck is the residue of design.
- Branch Rickey
A mediocre strategist reduces legal representation to a bureaucratic
routine and approaches work serially, thinking about each task for the
first time only after the preceding one is completed. When a tactic is
chosen, the mediocre strategist is willing to act on the first "good" idea
that appears, without imagining a full range of options and failing to
evaluate the effectiveness of whatever few options might be apparent.
Often, decisions are not accompanied by a conscious attempt to predict
how they will influence events, and if predictions are made, they turn out
to be inaccurate far more often than necessary. Disconcerting facts tend
to be ignored, and tactics tend either to be changed impulsively or to be
adhered to despite mounting evidence of their ineffectiveness.
To a shocking extent, these lawyers litigate without strategy because
the tactics they use lack strategic coherence: tactics are not designed for
a cumulative effect, and at times they even conflict with each other.
Rather than design litigation to cause a favorable result, these lawyers
process it in the same mechanical way that a government agency
processes paper. When asked, they usually cannot describe their strategy
in a given case or explain how their tactics are related to the goal of the
litigation. Sometimes they are unable to describe even the goal itself.
And tactics in current cases tend to be justified by post hoc ergo propter
hoc9 analyses of episodes in past cases. Although no published empirical
research has ever attempted to estimate the proportion of the bar that
muddles through in this way, anecdotal evidence suggests that it may be
a majority of the profession, and this mechanical approach to strategy
certainly seems to be the natural instinct of the overwhelming majority of
persons entering the practice of law.
A more or less average strategist, on the other hand, considers at least
a range of alternatives before acting and thinks at least a few steps
ahead-for example, by mentally sketching out a complaint while interviewing the client and by later drafting the complaint to minimize the
risk of a successful motion to dismiss. An average strategist, however,
lacks the imagination needed to generate the largest possible number of
reasonable options, the capacity to predict accurately the success of each
one, the ability to treat time retrospectively, and the intellectual agility
needed for strategic coherence.
A superior strategist, by contrast, designs a struggle in its entirety at
the beginning and redesigns it continually as new circumstances come to
light. Certain habits of mind are essential to this process.
9. "[P]ost hoc, ergo propter hoc denotes the fallacy of confusing sequence with consequence." B. Garner, A Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage 424 (1987).
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First-and preliminarily-a superior strategist has a skepticism' 0 that
compels him or her to identify precisely the very few things-facts,
pieces of evidence, aspects of law or policy-that are most likely to influence the resolution of the conflict. The same skepticism senses disguised
opportunity, exposes unstated assumptions, inventories each side's
strengths and weaknesses, and finds hidden risks, thus causing the strategist to anticipate that which is exploitable and that which realistically
could go wrong.
Second, a superior strategist identifies the future event" that, if
brought about, would be most likely to cause victory. What adjudicative
decision, for example, would most likely terminate the conflict favorably,1 2 and what actions are most likely to cause that decision? What
injury will so wound the adversary that he or she will be compelled to
negotiate on favorable terms? Or conversely, what constructive event
will so seduce the adversary that a negotiation is likely to end favorably?
In a purely rational sense, the superior strategist "identifies" this event,
but more practically the event is imagined in precise and vivid detail."
Third, a superior strategist organizes strategy around the decisive
event by "backward mapping": 4 planning backward-from the future
10. See B. Tuchman, Practicing History 280 (1981).
11. Depending on how one conceives of it, the "event" might actually be a handful of
interrelated events, or it might be a decisive idea-such as a theory of the case-that
seduces others into action or causes the adversary's strategy to unravel.
12. For example, where a client complains of the continuing behavior of other people,
the decisive event might turn out to be a preliminary injunction that so greatly restricts
behavior as to skew negotiation in the client's favor; or a summary judgment embodying
a permanent injunction, a declaratory judgment or an award of damages; or one of those
forms of relief gained through trial; and so on. A superior strategist can often identify the
decisive event much more specifically: "this trial will be won or lost according to how
well this witness stands up under cross-examination" or "the only way to win this motion
is to convince the judge that the Court of Appeals is likely to adopt the Silkwood test."
(A more complex example appears in note 28, infra.)
Although these predictions turn out to be inaccurate more frequently than any lawyer
would like, a strategist's superiority is largely measurable by the ability to choose a decisive event wisely and to organize and concentrate effort to cause it. Often, the decisive
event cannot be recognized until well after conflict has begun. Once that event is identified, however, effort is wasted unless directed at causing it, at protecting a back-up strategy, see note 23 and accompanying text, or at preventing the adversary from
accomplishing something decisive.
13. Imagery has a powerful effect in creative thinking, which is often and misleadingly described only in verbal and rational terms. See V. John-Steiner, Notebooks of the
Mind: Explorations of Thinking 84-88 (1985). In fact, "a reliance on verbal concepts
alone may lead . . . to a certain rigidity of thought." Id. at 86. That is because the
process of finding solutions is filled with "inner monologues, crystallized concepts, reveries, fleeting as well as generic images, abstract pictures, visualized movements, and subjective feelings." Id. at 87. The same is true of daydreaming, "a form of mental activity
frowned upon by people who are immersed in the practicality of life and who want immediate action." S. Arieti, Creativity: The Magic Synthesis 374 (1976). Although some
people daydream in order to retreat into an unrealistic fantasy life, for others daydreaming "may open up unforeseeable new realms of growth and discovery." Id. at 375.
14. R. Neustadt & E. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for DecisionMakers 255 (1986). For carefully documented examples of the effective use of this pro-
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to the present-to identify things that must be done to make that event
probable and by developing sub-strategies to accomplish each of those
things. No concept of strategy ismore important than this one: it prevents aimless expense of effort and concentrates the strategist's work on
those things most likely to cause the desired end of the conflict. 5 The
cess and of disaster caused by its absence, see R. Huntford, Scott and Amundsen: The
Race to the South Pole 479-525 (1980) (treating climate and terrain collectively as the
adversary, Amundsen's strategic planning enabled his party to travel 1400 miles on crosscountry skis across shelf ice and glaciers, actually gaining weight in the process, while
everyone in Scott's lavishly financed but incompetently prepared expedition died of
scurvy and starvation).
15. Mark Tushnet has argued that the NAACP's litigation effort leading up to Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was "not systematic or strategic" because "the
contents of that 'plan' changed with some frequency" and a fair amount of the NAACP's
litigation effort was directed at "targets of opportunity." M. Tushnet, The NAACP's
Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925-50, at 144-45 (1987). Stephen Wasby
similarly argues that later desegregation litigation was unstrategized because the course
of events was never completely under the NAACP's "control," see Wasby, How Planned
Is "PlannedLitigation"?, 1984 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 83, 91; because "accidental factors" were "often decisive," id. at 118; because "there was a 'lot of improvization, a lot of
impromptu,'" id. at 92; and because "not all cases which end up in the Supreme Court
were started with that in mind." Id. at 118.
These theories are based on misunderstandings about the nature of strategic thinking.
Both Tushnet and Wasby undervalue the role of creativity in strategy development. Both
mistakenly assume that a strategy is by definition a fixed and unchangeable plan that is
inadequate unless it is the entire cause of victory. And both ignore the fact that a movement seeking revolutionary change is usually so inherently weak that, simply to retain its
constituency, it must devote substantial effort to "putting out brushfires," id. at 87, even
while following a long-term strategy not addressed to things that burn.
Like other forms of artistic creativity, strategy develops in stops and starts, and reflection may bring insights up into consciousness long after those insights have influenced the
evolving artistic product on an unconscious level. It would not surprise us if a novelist, in
the midst of work, were unable to tell us the eventual fate of a coffin he has just introduced into the forecastle of the Pequod: even in the most perfectly plotted novel the act
of creation is not complete until the last page of the final draft is written. See infra note
19 and accompanying text. Nor was it unstrategic, as Tushnet urges, for NAACP lawyers to begin litigating in the upper South for simple convenience and later to concentrate
effort there once the region's strategic advantages became apparent. See M. Tushnet,
supra, at 162-63. A strategy is a living, changing thing, and these lawyers improved their
strategy as they learned more about the conflict in which they were engaged. That kind
of evolution shows strategic skill, not weakness.
With rare exceptions, even a well-built strategy does not unfold so cleanly that the
adversary is reduced to helplessness in precisely the manner that the strategist originally
envisioned. Even the best strategist cannot rob life of its chaos by reordering that which
is naturally random into a rigidly controlled sequence of events. A more realistic concept
of strategy is the shepherdingof chaos so that it travels toward the decisive event.
A litigation campaign is not unstrategized simply because accidents turn out to be
decisive or because the cases that are appealed are not the ones that were designed for
that purpose. Strategy depends in part on the ability to integrate the unexpected into an
evolving plan-to capitalize on accidents, rather than be victimized by them. The
NAACP lawyers demonstrated that skill in abundance. Sometimes, a strategist's relation
to the decisive event is not that the strategist causes it, but instead that the event happens
independently of the strategist's efforts and the strategist recognizes its potential and acts
to endow it with its decisive quality. It cannot reasonably be argued, for example, that all
of Trotsky's careful preparation and planning were not the foundation for the occurrences of October 24 and 25, 1917, simply because on October 16 the Petrograd garrison

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

only battles fought, then, are those that are likely to help terminate the
conflict in the client's favor.16 Effort is not diffused and wasted on other
had collectively decided to disobey Kerensky's orders to march out of the city-an event
that Trotsky himself recognized "in advance decided the outcome of the contest." I.
Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879-1921, at 300 (1954). In fact, it would
have decided nothing if Trotsky had not found a way of using it. Revolutionary situations are rarely the creation of revolutionists, who start in weakness; instead, the true skill
of revolution is the recognition and exploitation of revolutionary situations created by
others or by circumstances that are out of everyone's control.
A wise strategist "is able to recognize changing circumstances and to act expediently."
Sun-tzu, The Art of War, ch. 1, verse 7 (S. Griffith trans. 1963) (commentary by Tu Mu).
Moreover, it is axiomatic in military strategy-and ought to be axiomatic in litigation
strategy-that if a plan is rigid, overly intricate and unadaptable, it will become meaningless within the first few moments of battle when all hell breaks loose in the most unexpected ways. That is exactly what happened at the Somme in 1916, where the British,
obeying an inflexible 57-page order, were led into slaughter, suffering 60,000 casualties on
the first day. See M. Van Creveld, Command in War 159-68 (1985). (A reader who is
skeptical about whether this type of material can teach lawyers anything about strategy
might consider the contents of note 101, infra.).
In fact, the historical evidence from which Wasby and Tushnet conclude that desegregation litigation was unstrategized can in almost every instance be used to support the
opposite conclusion. Charles Houston was the leading NAACP litigator early in this
struggle, as well as the teacher of the group, led by Thurgood Marshall, that succeeded
him. It is not historically accurate to argue, as Tushnet does, that "Houston simply felt
more comfortable as a lawyer attacking targets of opportunity than as a long-range planner of litigation." M. Tushnet, supra, at 45.
Nearly two decades before Brown v. Board of Education reached the Supreme Court,
Houston conceived of a strategy of dismantling educational segregation in stages, from
the top to the bottom. The first stage was to persuade the judiciary of the cruelty and
indefensibility of segregation in the one form of education that judges could most easily
understand-law schools and other forms of professional and post-graduate education.
That was also a form of education where integration would least alarm the white population and for which states could hardly afford to build separate facilities that were even
arguably equal. Then, once the judiciary had been conditioned to suspect that separate
could never truly be equal, the plan was to seek, in successive litigation, a gradual extension of the same logic to other graduate schools, to undergraduate education and, finally,
to local public schools. That strategy was followed from Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md.
478, 182 A. 590 (1936), through Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332
U.S. 631 (1948), Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950). The only drastic change in strategy-and one acceded to by Houston shortly before his death in 1950-was to accelerate
the effort and seek an early Supreme Court ruling (obtained in Brown in 1954) that separate facilities were per se unconstitutional in any form of public education. (Unfortunately, the details of these events are most fully recorded in two histories that do not
analyze them. See R. Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality (1980); G. McNeil, Groundwork:
Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle for Civil Rights (1983)). That change in
strategy was made to capitalize on exactly the kind of thing that Wasby calls an "accident": the small but distinct evolution in the public and judicial moods following the
Second World War, characterized by the integration of the armed services and professional baseball and the adoption of a civil rights platform at the 1948 Democratic convention.
Although a full consideration of the question is beyond the scope of this Article, one
might ponder the extent to which the impotence of the Critical Legal Studies movement
outside the academy-and often inside it-is related to its strategic Hegelianism illustrated here. See infra note 55.
16. Practicing law out of a 20 by 22-foot office over a harness store in Springfleld,

1990]

ON STRATEGY

305

things. Where strategy is well-concentrated and where the circumstances
permit, the consequence can be the creation of "a strategic situation so
advantageous that if it does not of itself produce [victory], its continuation by a battle is sure" to do so." 7 This is made all the more difficult by
the problem of identifying decisive events, which are often obscured by
massed and unrecognized assumptions.' 8
Illinois, Lincoln tried over 3,000 cases and argued about 250 appeals before the Illinois
Supreme Court. See J. Frank, Lincoln as a Lawyer 3 (1961); N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1989,
at B7, col. 6. He was a local lawyer only, with a practice and reputation largely limited to
central Illinois. See J. Frank, supra, at 171-72. Except for the last five years of his practice, when he began to develop a corporate clientele, his cases were primarily private
disputes of the "one-shot" variety. Id. at 41, 168. When he was catapulted into the
Presidency, he had almost no background making decisions in large struggles, much less
in war itself. "He had no previous experience in public administration .... and by every
account he could not even very efflectively command his own family." Id. at 151. But
history has judged him "a better natural strategist than were most of the trained
soldiers." T. Williams, Lincoln and His Generals 7 (1952); accord E. Larrabee, Commander In Chief 643 (1987).
Apparently, Lincoln analyzed the war just as he had learned to analyze litigation. For
three years, his generals all insisted on concentrating their efforts on capturing the Confederate capital at Richmond. Practically from the beginning, Lincoln recognized that
those efforts were wasted because they would not cause the adversary to surrender, and
that the decisive event would instead be the destruction of Lee's army, something Lincoln's generals were too insecure even to attempt. See T. Williams, supra, at 7-10. The
result was the sad succession of commanders--each being replaced after Lincoln was
unable to teach him to think strategically-until Grant finally appeared. And even Grant
began by considering his predecessors' mistaken approach and had to be tutored to the
contrary by Lincoln. See id. at 295-96. Taken as a whole, this was the gravest single
strategic judgment ever made by an American lawyer: the future of a nation rested on it,
and hundreds of thousands died in accordance with it.
17. B. Liddell Hart, supra note 6, at 339 (emphasis added). The point is to gain "a
strategic dislocation... a decisive advantage previous to battle." Id. at 339-40. In chess,
for example, one's adversary might as well resign without so much as losing a pawn when
one has gained so much control over the center of the board that the adversary's freedom
of movement barely exists. "Thus a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle." Sun-tzu, supra note 15, at ch. 4, verse 14.
In law, something similar can happen in what might be called "prelitigation": knowing that a later dispute might erupt, a superior strategist drafts a contract or a will, for
example, with enough foresight that litigation, even years later, would be tilted as much
as possible in the client's favor. But in law and elsewhere, the lack of drama in such a
victory often deprives the strategist of credit. "A victory gained before the situation has
crystallized is one the common man does not comprehend." Id. at ch. 4, verse 11 (commentary by Tu Mu). "When you subdue your enemy without fighting[,] who will pronounce you valorous?" Id. (commentary by Ho Yen-hsi).
18. For example, now that the Supreme Court has Dred-Scotted abortion rights into
a political issue, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989)-thus
inviting anti-abortionists to lobby and pressure every state legislature in the country-a
pro-choice strategy limited to counter-lobbying and counter-pressure is not likely to
cause eventual victory. At best, it may only prolong the conflict indefinitely because of
the moral issues involved and the political dynamics with which they have been infused.
This conflict is further protracted by widespread tactics like the intimidation of women
seeking abortions, of doctors and hospitals performing abortions and of pharmaceutical
companies that might market RU-486. Such an interminable struggle can exhaust feminism's energies and divert resources indefinitely from other needs. Although counterlobbying and counter-pressure are necessary in the short run to prevent the situation
from worsening, they are an inherently defensive strategy and do little or nothing to
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Fourth, a superior strategist works through the full process of creativdestroy the adversary's strength, which is the only way to bring this struggle to a successful conclusion.
Here, the anti-abortion movement's largest single strength is the aggressive involvement of the entirely male clergy of the largest religious organization in the United States.
Although the withdrawal of that clergy from an active role in this controversy would be
an event that would decide most of the conflict, real inquiry into how that might be
brought about is practically forbidden by a mass of assumptions about its supposed impossibility. Little could have been accomplished by litigation aimed at depriving that
organization of its tax-exempt status, such as the failed attempt in United States Catholic
Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988). Not only do such
lawsuits stiffen the adversary's will to fight, but even if the plaintiffs had somehow succeeded in court, Congress would have been besieged with irresistible demands for amendments to the tax code that would have mooted out the entire issue.
A more effective strategic inquiry would seek ways of accelerating the natural evolution in the response of clergy to concepts that are historically inevitable but temporarily
stigmatized by pasts of unacceptability:
So long as it seems safe [clergy] fight [such a concept] in the open, hitting valiantly on both sides of the belt, and trying to gain a quick victory by sheer
ferocity. But once it becomes apparent that this quick victory is impossible,
they begin to be more discreet. First they try to force some element of conformity into the heresy before them. Then they discover that it is not a heresy at all.
And then they proceed to declare that they were never against it.
H.L. Mencken, Treatise on the Gods 259 (2d ed. 1946). Catholic clergy went through
exactly this evolution with Columbian geography, Copernican and Galilean astrophysics,
modern banking (charging interest as a sin), Darwinian biology, first amendment rights
(Syllabus of Errors, 1864), and (until Rerum Novarum, 1891) membership in labor unions and any other activity that might dilute the power of private property. But massed
assumptions now discourage inquiry into whether the same process can be accelerated in
the case of abortion.
For example, the image of Catholic laity unwilling to speak up against their clergy
obscures the option of creating among laity a crisis of confidence in clerical rule-making
that could so demoralize the clergy as to hasten their withdrawal from the conflict. Assumptions that Catholic laity are solidly anti-abortion are belied by polling evidence that
shows Catholics either favoring abortion to a greater extent than Protestants, see N.Y.
Times, June 30, 1990, at 7, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1989, at Al, col. 6; N.Y. Times,
Sept. 10, 1987, at Al, col.3, or at least not opposing abortion more than Protestants. See
G. Gallup & J. Castelli, The American Catholic People: Their Beliefs, Practices, and
Values 93-94 (1987); see also A. Greeley, Crisis in the Church 213-14, 241-42 (1979)
(alienation of laity because of the Church's lack of "sexual credibility").
But this is unlikely to ripen into confrontation between clergy and laity as long as the
laity remain unaware that their clergy have not been honest with them about the
Church's history on the issue of whether a fetus acquires a soul, and thus becomes a
person, at the moment of conception. For nearly the entirety of its existence-and until
the revisionism of 1869 to 1917-the Church taught that a fetus does not become ensouled at conception. Before the period of revisionism, the Church did not consider abortion of a pre-ensoulment fetus to be homicide. Although some individual Catholic
writers argued that ensoulment occurs at conception, and although the Church considered abortion in a general sense to be morally wrong, Church policy recognized qualifications and distinctions based on whether the fetus had passed the point of ensoulment and
whether the pregnancy endangered the mother. See D. Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice
and Morality 410-16 (1970); J. Connery, Abortion: The Development of Roman Catholic Perspective 63-64, 212, 306-07 (1977); Coriden, Church Law and Abortion, 33 Jurist
184 passim (1973); Curran, Abortion Law and Morality in Contemporary Catholic Theology, 33 Jurist 162, 170-73 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 133 n.22 (1973); N.Y.
Times, Jan. 30, 1990, at A23, col. 3; see also J. Connery, supra, at 211 ("a consensus of
theologians regarding immediate animation [i.e., ensoulment] was reached (only] in the
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ity,' 9 generating the largest possible number of reasonable strategic opsecond half of the nineteenth century"). Under post-revisionist church law, however, a
Catholic is automatically excommunicated for aborting a fetus, see 1983 Code c. 1398, but
not for murdering a human being (unless that human being happens to be the Pope). See
1983 Code c.1336, 1370 & 1397.
The history of abortion in the United States has been similarly lied about: in the midnineteenth century, before the enactment of anti-abortion statutes, abortion was openly
practiced, abortion clinics were widespread, the abortion rate may have been higher than
it is now and middle-class married women had come to consider abortion an important
means of controlling their own destinies. When enacted, those statutes were not usually
motivated by any desire to protect an ensouled fetus. Instead, legislatures reacted to
intense lobbying by a medical profession that felt threatened by the economics of abortion. See J. Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy
1800-1900, at 147-70 (1978).
Assumptions have clouded the possibility that the Catholic clergy might become demoralized enough to withdraw from an active role in the abortion conflict if a significant
proportion of the laity were to adopt the habit of incessantly demanding principled explanations for what seem to have been arbitrary and unexplainable rules-and arbitrary and
unexplainable changes in those rules-and if the laity were to contemplate openly a religious alternative to their differences with the Catholic clergy. The Episcopal Church
considers itself a "catholic" church, Episcopal theology generally tracks Roman Catholic
theology, and in many Episcopal congregations the liturgy is close to the Roman Catholic. Unlike Roman Catholicism, however, Episcopal doctrine has adopted many feminist
values: the legalization of abortion has been endorsed, a large number of women have
been ordained as priests, and one has been elected a bishop. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 6,
1989, at A20,col 6.
Here, even though a potentially decisive event has been obscured by assumptions, it is
itself based, first, on acceptance of one of the adversary's assumptions (that abortion is a
religious issue) and, second, on rolling that assumption back on the adversary by converting the issue of abortion into an issue of democracy in the church, thus raising the
specter--certainly frightening to the adversary--of feminism's leading significant numbers of laity out of the Church and into another religion.
19. Effective strategizing tracks the creative process, which the research has broken
down into the following stages: (1) a recognition stage, in which a need to control an
event is noticed; (2) a preparation stage, in which raw information about assets and impediments is gathered in a fairly open-ended manner, (3) an option-generation stage, in
which the largest reasonable number of competing methods for controlling the event are
hypothesized; (4) an option-evaluation stage, in which each method is assessed for effectiveness; and (5) a decisional stage, in which the option evaluations are compared and the
most effective option chosen. For a more detailed explanation, see Neumann, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique, 40 Hastings LJ.725, 744-49 (1989).

"In the daily stream of thought these... stages constantly overlap each other as we
explore different problems .... Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be

unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect," G. Wallas, The Art of Thought 81-82 (1926), which
is why solutions often surface into consciousness "unexpectedly, with surprising suddenness." T. Amabile, The Social Psychology of Creativity 85 (1983). And creative work is
an uneven mixture of "sudden bursts of insight and tiring efforts of execution." V.JohnSteiner, supra note 13, at 79.
Creativity in youth is somewhat different from creativity in middle age, which more
closely resembles the process of strategy. "[Tihe creativity of the twenties and early thirties tends to be. . . 'hot-from-the-fire[,]' . . . spontaneous, intense, or precipitative ....
[But what happens in] the late thirties and thereafter, is... 'sculpted creativity.' The
inspiration may be just as intense and the unconscious work as active as before, but there
is much intermediary processing between the initial and the final stages." S. Arieti, supra
note 13, at 381 (summarizing findings in E. Jacques, Work, Creativity and Social Justice
(1970)).
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tions and accurately predicting the effectiveness of each.2 °
Fifth, a superior strategist protects against failure in two ways. 2 1 The
first is to identify points of weakness and to create sub-strategies to shore
them up. 22 The second is to develop back-up strategies and sub-strategies in case the original strategy proves partly or entirely ineffective.
Even where an eventual decisive event can be identified, a contingency
plan is desirable for each predictable possible failure along the way. A
superior strategist therefore identifies alternative decisive events and, reasoning backward from future to present, strategizes to cause them, in
case they become needed.2 3 Ideally, primary and alternative strategies
20. For a description of the research on option-generation and option-evaluation, see
Neumann, supra note 19, at 746-49, 751-52. In essence, option-generation depends on an
eye for exploitable opportunity, together with "an uninhibited flow of association, during
which judgment is suspended and [valuable] ideas ...

arrive mixed together with ideas

that eventually turn out to be wrong or even silly. Paradoxically, the critical judgment on
which option-evaluation depends can impoverish option-generation, censoring sound
ideas before their potential can be noticed." Id. at 751 (citations omitted). Option-generation is more productive when fantasy facilitates the flow of association. See Rogers,
Toward a Theory of Creativity, in Creativity and Its Cultivation 76 (H. Anderson ed.
1959).
Option-generation derives from the ability to see things "differently," finding ways of
transforming, for example, an adversary's special strength into a weakness or the lawyer's
own weakness into a strength. Developing a theory of the case is especially dependent on
this process. For example, until Charles Houston became involved, pre-Shelley v.
Kramer restrictive covenant litigation was simple and straightforward: the plaintiff alleged that the covenant existed, that the defendant resided in the covenanted property,
that the defendant was a Negro, and that the plaintiff was white (and therefore not personally in violation of the covenant). As soon as these allegations were proved, a court
would order that the defendant be ejected. Occasionally, defendants raised constitutional
arguments, which were summarily rejected. For the most part, these cases were as routine as run-of-the-mill landlord-tenant litigation. But Houston began denying-and requiring plaintiffs to prove-that they were white and that the defendants were black. See
C. Vose, Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases 60-61 (1959). This produced cross-examinations that searched into plaintiffs'
ancestries for several generations, stunning plaintiffs and the communities they represented. Houston's purpose was not to be procedurally obstructive: it was instead part of
a much larger effort to persuade the courts, the public and the parties themselves that
distinctions based on race are meaningless. "Every time you drag these plaintiffs in and
deny that they are white," Houston said, "you begin to make them think about it. That is
the beginning of education on the subject. In denying that your defendants are Negroes,
you go to the question of the standards of race. There are many people who cannot give
any reason why they are white." Id. at 61.
21. See generally R. Huntford, supra note 14, passim (especially in this respect,
Amundsen's expedition to the South Pole was a model of strategic planning, while Scott's
was a catalog of strategic incompetence).
22. Strategy thus depends on an ability to understand how the adversary thinks: his
needs, "his capabilities, his training, his psychology." B. Tuchman, supra note 10, at 280.
23. For example, when suing a private organization that could be expected to claim
that its discrimination was outside the scope of existing statutes addressing governmental
discrimination, Charles Houston would also sue any government that provided the organization with any kind of discretionary benefit, on the theory that a government acts
outside its powers when so aiding discriminatory organizations. See, e.g., Kerr v. Enoch
Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.) (defendant was a privately owned public
library that received municipal funds), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945); Norris v. Mayor
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should so interlock that the strategist can switch to an alternative strategy when the primary strategy becomes unproductive or when the alternative presents unexpected opportunity. The point is to ensure flexibility
and adaptability to changing circumstances and to guard against false

assumptions. 24

Sixth, a superior strategist juggles masses of detail to produce strategic
coherence. In addition to thinking forward and backward in time, a superior strategist can also "think of many matters at once, in their interdependence, their related importance, and their consequences" 25 -all in
order to fit together the pieces of the main strategy, to coordinate the
execution of tactics, to test actions continually for their effectiveness, and
to manage windows through which the strategist can shift to a back-up
strategy if necessary.2 6 To coordinate ideas and effort so widely spread
out over time or space, a strategist must be able to think in several
dimensions at the same time27 and see the entire conflict as an organic
of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948) (primary defendant was Maryland Institute
for the Promotion of the Mechanic Arts, a private organization). While today this might
seem like a routine plaintiffs' strategy, Houston implemented it before modern civil rights
statutes, before personal injury lawyers developed the custom of suing anyone with the
faintest financial connection to the issues, and at a time when concepts of state action
were more narrowly defined than they are now.
24. All other things being equal, a strategy that would foreclose another is for that
reason alone the alternate.
25. B. Tuchman, supra note 10, at 278. Compare, for example, Brooklyn Dodgers
president Branch Rickey's multi-faceted strategy for integrating baseball, J. Tygiel, Baseball's Great Experiment: Jackie Robinson and His Legacy 47-70, 119, 145-52, 161-77,
206-08 (1983), with Cleveland Indians owner Bill Veeck's equally well-intentioned but
more one-dimensional and less successful approach. Id. at 40-41. Ultimately, Veeck had
to follow Rickey's lead. See id. at 211-45.
26. Research on the psychology of business executives has shown that
the most successful corporate leaders think in a style notable for its complexity
....

This so-called cognitive complexity .

.

. include[s] the ability to plan

strategically without being rigidly locked in to one course of events; the capacity
to acquire ample information for decision-making without being over-whelmed
and being able to grasp relationships between rapidly changing events.
Executives who do not think in this complex way... see problems in isolation from each other, and often rigidly hold to a single overriding goal, such as
profit.
The successful executives, however, have the mental capacity, the temperament and the inclination to confront complexities even in small problems. [According to one researcher,] they "tend to plan long into the future, taking into
account all possible events that can be anticipated, as well as the consequences
of those events."
N. Y. Times, July 31, 1984, at Cl, cols. 4-5.
27. For example, Bill James theorizes that success as a baseball manager depends on
the ability to strategize in three dimensions at once: strategy for an individual game,
strategy for the season as a whole and strategy for the long-term development of individual players:
[A] manager makes about 70 game-level decisions in an average day, or about
11,000 a year....

[Although m]any managers... try to preplan as many as possible of their
player utilization patterns so as to minimize the decisions required at this
level[,J ... the most successful managers, like Earl Weaver, Whitey Herzog, and
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whole.2 8
Sparky Anderson tend to deliberately keep at least one or two positions open to
allow them to make day-to-day realignments....
Weaver used to say that the biggest decision he had to make all year was who
was the twenty-fifth man on the roster out of spring training. He would turn his
roster over and over in his head, looking at question after question. If I have
Gary Roenicke in left field to start the game and I have to pinch hit for my
shortstop early in the game, will I still have another option later in the game? If
it's a 7-4 game in the second inning and we've knocked out their starter but
we're still three runs behind and they switch to a left-hander, can I change to a
right-handed lineup without ruining my defense?
B. James, The Bill James Baseball Abstract 1988, at 117, 119 (1988); accord G. Will, Men
at Work 7-75 (1990); E. Weaver, Weaver On Strategy 51-65, 153-74 (1984).
Franklin Roosevelt's superiority as a strategist was based in part on the fact that "his
was not a syllogistic or logical mind, given to sequential reasoning, not a linear mind in
McLuhan terms but a mosaic one, suited for the discerning of patterns and syntheses, 'for
knowing all kinds of diverse things at once in a flash.'" E. Larrabee, supra note 16, at
644 (quoting Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins).
28. See B. Tuchman, The First Salute 176-77 (1988); see also T. Williams, supra note
16, at 7 (Lincoln "saw the big picture of the war from the start"). The following is based
on R. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent 303-84 (1990):
In 1948, Lyndon Johnson, who was then a Congressman, had stolen a primary election
for the Democratic nomination for United States Senator in an era when that nomination
in Texas automatically led to victory in the general election. In some corruptly governed
counties, ballot-stuffing and graveyard-voting of a kind that today seems incomprehensible had given Johnson a state-wide plurality of only 87 votes. Johnson's opponent, a
former governor named Coke Stevenson, had obtained an order in United States District
Court preliminarily enjoining state election officials from placing Johnson's name on the
general election ballot. The district court had also dispatched magistrates, accompanied
by federal marshals, to the counties involved to hold hearings and examine voting
records, including, if necessary, the ballot boxes themselves.
Time appeared to preclude appellate review of the preliminary injunction or of any
action the district court might take on the basis of the magistrates' findings. The magistrates had instructions to make their reports by October 2. By state law, if the injunction
were not dissolved by October 3, the general election ballots would be printed without
Johnson's name (and he had almost no hope of winning as a write-in candidate). The
October 3 deadline could not be challenged: it took many weeks to print all the paper
ballots then in use, and no court would order the rescheduling of the November general
election. The Fifth Circuit was not scheduled to convene until October 4, and an individual Court of Appeals judge was not likely to stay the injunction. The United States
Supreme Court also would not convene until October 4.
Johnson was in an even more immediate danger. His state-wide margin of 87 votes was
so thin and his reported majorities in the disputed counties so impossibly lopsided that
the disclosure of the true contents of a single ballot box might give the nomination to
Stevenson. It might also have sent several people-perhaps including Johnson himselfto prison. A lot of money had backed Johnson in the primary, and that money had also
hired many of the best known litigators in Texas to ensure that no such ballot box would
ever be opened.
But it appeared that ballot boxes would be opened. The magistrates still had ten days
to hold hearings when Johnson and his lawyers met in a hotel conference room in Fort
Worth on September 22.
[N]one of the roomful of attorneys could think of any way to get the injunction
overturned and investigation stopped .... The lawyers went off separately and
wrote drafts of an appeal.... Then they came back and discussed them. There
was no agreement, either on the broad ground for the appeal or on the specific
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Finally, a superior strategist adamantly refuses to submit to the mercy
of events and has confidence that events can be influenced or even controlled if the means to do so can be worked out. A superior strategist,
then, has decisiveness2 9 (the capacity to act under pressure) and presence
arguments to be used. They couldn't even agree on the court to which the
[issue should be taken] ....
Id. at 368. This debate was made interminable by the war stories and peacocking familiar
to gatherings of trial attorneys. Finally, Johnson ran out of patience. He demanded that
Abe Fortas, then a 38-year-old Washington lawyer, be brought in at once.
Fortas was located, flown to Fort Worth and taken into a room containing what he
later described as "acres of lawyers." Fortas immediately did what none of the Texas
lawyers had been able to do. The Texas lawyers had focused on every separate courtroom skirmish, trying to win each of them one at a time. Fortas instead saw the entire
battle as an integrated whole, all of its diverse aspects fitting together into a single problem solvable through a strategy that addressed everything from the Supreme Court's October term schedule to the hearings about to be conducted by magistrates in modest rural
courthouses in South Texas.
The Texas lawyers had wanted to argue their case fully to every judge who might
listen, hoping that one of them might rule in Johnson's favor. Fortas realized from the
start that this would be counterproductive. Each additional judge would take time to
rule, and even if the ruling were favorable, Coke Stevenson could appeal further, preserving the risk that on October 3 the injunction would not have been dissolved, the incriminating ballot boxes would have been opened, or both.
Fortas realized that the decisive event would be a stay of the injunction and of the
magistrates' fact-finding authority by a judge from whose order no appeal could be taken
within the available time. Because the Supreme Court's term began on October 4, that
judge was-and could only be-Hugo Black, the Supreme Court justice assigned to the
Fifth Circuit. Black's views on federal jurisdiction suggested the heightened possibility
that he would rule favorably on those grounds, but to get to Black in time, Johnson
would have to get through the Fifth Circuit itself as quickly as possible. Fortas suggested
deliberately losing in the Fifth Circuit by making a quick and weak presentation to the
circuit judge least likely to be persuaded by it. Although this may have been the only way
of getting to Black in time, it is the kind of tactic lawyers abhor.
Although the Texas lawyers had debated the problem for days, Fortas took little more
than an hour to comprehend the entire battle and devise a strategy to win all of it at once.
A losing application was quickly made to a Fifth Circuit judge predisposed against it, and
on September 24 that application was denied. On September 25, Johnson's Washington
lawyers applied to Black for a stay, and Black agreed to hear argument on September 28.
On September 27, the magistrates began holding hearings in the disputed counties, and
for three days Johnson's Texas lawyers tied up the hearings with dilatory arguments and
testimony. On September 29, Black signed an order staying both the injunction and the
magistrate's hearings until the Supreme Court could decide the issue. When this order
was communicated by telephone to the courthouses in South Texas, one of the federal
magistrates was literally stopped in the act of prying open ballot boxes himself. The
general election ballots were subsequently printed listing Johnson as the Democratic
nominee, and a few weeks later he was elected in a then entirely Democratic state. The
ballots in the disputed boxes were never recounted.
Thus, a respected lawyer and future Supreme Court justice provided a strategy that
made it possible to steal an election. The moral issues raised thereby are considered in
Part III of this Article.
29. There is a difference between indecisiveness and "the ability to delay a choice"
until the most appropriate time to make it. See J. Getzels & P. Jackson, Creativity and
Intelligence 126 (1962) (emphasis added). The latter is a valuable capacity in strategy
and rests on a "tolerance for ambiguity." See id. Without it, decisions are made prematurely on fragmentary information that may become more complete before a decision
truly must be made. See id.
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of mind (the capacity to compare options while under pressure).30 Consequently, a superior strategist resists the temptation to act on motivations that are not strategic. A tactic is not strategic if it is used to satisfy
the lawyer's own emotional needs-for example, to vent anger, to hide
fear, to create a reassuring illusion of doing something, to avoid admitting the error of earlier actions, or to reflect the lawyer's personality or
style. Nor is a tactic strategic if it is chosen to use resources merely
because they are available or to maintain momentum, without considering the consequences. That which feels good or reassuring is distinguishable from that which is strategically wise. 3 '
30. In the Russian turmoil of 1905, all the Petersburg labor parties had joined in
organizing a soviet of workers' delegates, which, among other things, coordinated two
months of strikes for an eight-hour work day. The soviet's executive council was in session in a building that was suddenly surrounded by Cossacks and Czarist police. The
delegates knew instantly that escape was impossible. Moreover, the meeting room was
filled with documents that the Czarists could use against them and to identify others who
were absent. Destroying these documents was the only way that the delegates might be
able to influence their fate, but that would take time.
As a police officer entered the executive council's meeting room, interrupted a speech
and began to read the arrest warrant, Trotsky, who was presiding, sternly ordered him to
stop: "Please do not interfere with the speaker. If you wish to take the floor, you must
give your name and I shall ask the meeting whether it wishes to listen to you." I. Deutscher, supra note 15, at 143. The officer was so stunned by this display of authority that
he actually stood by silently while the trade-union delegate finished his speech. Trotsky
then solemnly asked the executive council whether the officer should be permitted to
make a statement "for the sake of information." Id. That was.agreed to, the officer read
the warrant and Trotsky moved on to the next item on the agenda. "Excuse me," interjected the police officer, looking at Trotsky hesitantly.
"Please do not interfere," Trotsky sharply rebuked him. "You have had the
floor; you have made your statement; we have acknowledged it. Does the meeting wish to have further dealings with the policeman?"
"No!"
"Then, please, leave the hall."
The officer shuffled his feet, muttered a few words and left. Trotsky called
upon the members of the Executive to destroy all documents ....
At length a strong detachment of police entered, and Trotsky declared "the
meeting of the Executive closed."
Id. at 143-44. Deutscher believes that Trotsky acted as he did for the sake of dignity. See
id. at 142-43. Although that might also be true, the more practical purpose of gaining
time seems inescapable.
Even though there were many acquittals, Trotsky was sentenced to life at hard labor in
Siberia after a trial in which he acted as his own attorney, conducted withering crossexaminations, and made an opening statement that even the prosecution characterized as
honest and courageous. See id. at 163-69.
31. Despite his creativity, Churchill was a weak strategist because his love of swashbuckling adventure deprived him of the ability to concentrate effort strategically. See
supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. "When Mr. Churchill proposed a peripheral
landing, anywhere between Norway and Dakar, Mr. Roosevelt was apt to retort, 'All
right, but where do we go from there?' which vexed the Prime Minister, since from many
of his favorite targets you could not go anywhere." S. Morison, supra note 8, at 29. In
Western Europe, the decisive event in ending the Second World War was the landing of
an Allied army safely in France, from which it would have the least obstructed route into
Germany, but Churchill wanted to delay the Normandy invasion indefinitely while pur-
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B.

The Strategic Persona

There are 55 reasons why I shouldn't have pitched him, but 56 why I
should.
- Casey Stengel, New York Yankees

manager,
on why he started Ed Lopat in the
seventh game of the 1952 World
Series
My main objection to Lou was that he managed by hunch and desperation. You ask Casey Stengel why he made a certain move and he will
tell you about a roommate he had in 1919 who demonstrated some
principle Casey was now putting into effect. You ask Lou and he will
say, 'The way we're going, we had to do something.' If there is a better
formula for making a bad situation worse, I have never heard it.
- Bill Veeck, owner of the Cleveland
Indians,
on why he wanted to fire manager
Lou Boudreau and hire Casey
Stengel in 1946
Even without empirical research-and none has ever been published
about the strategic temperament in law-one can easily recognize that
strategy will come only with great difficulty to a personality that feels
rocked by events it believes to be beyond its capacity to influence; 32 that
cannot plan ahead; that accepts things on their face and cannot look for
hidden information and patterns of factual relationships; that engages in
self-deceptions such as wishful thinking and ignoring "information which
is unpalatable or which conflicts with preconceptions;13 3 or that suffers
from the rigidity that impoverishes imagination or causes inflexible loyalty to an idea whose faults become increasingly apparent with time. But
surprisingly, strategy may not automatically come more easily to two
temperaments that in law are considered synonymous with competence.
One is the aggressive and confrontational temperament that represents
suing his "favorite targets"--which were everywhere except the decisive place. See id. at
51-52.
This kind of thinking, which can cause a morass like Italy (1943 to 1945) or a catastrophe like Gallipoli (1915 to 1916), was a constant source of tension between Churchill and
the Americans, whose sense of strategy was much more sharply focused. For example,
when Churchill demanded a joint invasion of the island of Rhodes on the ground that
"His Majesty's Government can't have its troops standing idle: muskets must flame"--in
other words, wanting to use a resource merely because it existed-General George C.
Marshall pointedly retorted that "not one American soldier is going to die on [that] goddamn beach." E. Larrabee, supra note 16, at 151.
32. See B. Tuchman, supra note 28, at 177-78 (self-pity among British generals during
the American Revolution).
33. N. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence 152 (1976) (emphasis
omitted).
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one species of the "persuasion mode."3 4 The other is the narrowly doctrinal temperament associated with the justice ethic identified by Carol
Gilligan.3 5
Persuasion-mode thinking is affiliated with a compulsion to posture
and argue, especially in ways that are "needlessly stylized and hyperbolic,"3 6 and to treat others as objects. Some lawyers go about this
loudly and confrontationally, others with more quiet cunning."
Although no empirical research has been published on the question, a
confrontational outlook may actually inhibit strategic thinking. In fact,
the freight-train roar of a confrontational lawyer at full throttle may
often be the equivalent of a "smokescreen of strategic bluster"3 8 that
camouflages the lawyer's own perplexity. Not only do "[p]ersuasionmode habits predispose lawyers to take evaluative stands automatically,"' 39 rather than after strategic reflection, but the continual self-justification in confrontational discourse is one of the "self-sealing properties
of [the] persuasion-mode" ' that inhibits lawyers from subjecting their
plans and ideas to the rigorous analysis necessary to strategy.
In Carol Gilligan's work, the contrasting ethics of justice and of care
are illustrated in the responses of two eleven-year-old children, Jake and
Amy, to a hypothetical called "Heinz's dilemma."'" Jake "speaks about
34. See Condlin, The Moral Failure Of Clinical Legal Education in The Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics 317, 327-32 (D. Luban ed. 1983); Condlin,
Socrates' New Clothes: SubstitutingPersuasionFor Learning In ClinicalPracticeInstruction, 40 Md. L. Rev. 223, 233-35, 239 (1981).
35. See C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice 25-38 (1982).
36. Condlin, Moral Failure,supra note 34, at 326.
37. See id. at 328 ("[T]he persuasion mode is not always associated with bad, unpleasant, aggressive behavior.... [It] is just as often a low-visibility, indirect, and even cordial
method of manipulating others."); infra note 109 and accompanying text.
38. Sherry, The Slide to Total Air War, The New Republic, Dec. 16, 1981, at 20-25
(citation omitted); see also Sun-tzu, supra note 15, at ch. 9, verse 36 ("When at night the
enemy's camp is clamorous, he is fearful.... His troops are terrified and insecure. They
are boisterous to reassure themselves.") (commentary by Tu Mu) (emphasis added).
39. Condlin, Moral Failure,supra note 34, at 330.
40. Id.; see also J. Getzels & P. Jackson, supra note 29, at 83 ("Those who have an
excessive faith in their ideas are not well fitted to make discoveries.") (quoting Mark
Bernard).
41. See C. Gilligan, supra note 35, at 25-37. Jake and Amy have been asked, in interviews, to state their opinions on Heinz's dilemma: Heinz's wife is ill, and her life can be
saved only with a drug that costs more money than Heinz and his wife have. The local
druggist refuses to lower his price. Jake and Amy have been asked whether Heinz should
steal the drug. Jake answers "yes":
For one thing, a human life is worth more than money, and if the druggist only
makes $1,000 he is still going to live, but if Heinz doesn't steal the drug, his wife
is going to die. (Why is life worth more than money?) Because the druggist can
get a thousand dollars later from rich people with cancer, but Heinz can't get
his wife again. . . . [I]f Heinz were caught, the judge would probably think it
was the right thing to do. [But wouldn't he be breaking the law?] [T]he laws
have mistakes, and you can't go writing up a law for everything you can
imagine.
Id. at 26 (emphasis added). Amy answers "no":
I think there might be other ways besides stealing it, like if he could borrow the
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equality, reciprocity, fairness, rights," while Amy "speaks about connection, not hurting, care, and response.")42 Gilligan presents these as alternative moral voices, 4 which they might well be. But they are also
different ways of approaching strategic problems, and one is much more
effective than the other.
Jake says that Heinz's dilemma is "a math problem with humans,""
which, in the circumstances, is a perceptive observation of the role of
symbolic logic in the equations that we call legal rules. In fact, for an
eleven-year-old, Jake does a rather thorough doctrinal analysis: "he
spots the legal issues of excuse and justification, balances the rights, and
reaches a decision, while considering implicitly, if not explicitly, the precedential effect of his decision. '45 In contrast, as Carrie Menkel-Meadow
has pointed out,
like a 'bad' law student [Amy] 'fights the hypo' [and] wants to know
more facts: Have Heinz and the druggist explored other possibilities,
like a loan or credit transaction? Why couldn't Heinz and the druggist
simply sit down and talk it out so that the druggist would come to see
the importance of Heinz's wife's life?46

As naive as those questions might at first seem, they reveal the more
strategic voice. Amy is close to finding the decisive event: "she considers the solution to the dilemma to lie in making the wife's condition more
salient to the druggist or, that failing, in appealing to others who are in a
position to help."'4 7 While Jake has responded monochromatically to
what he believes to be a question about hierarchical logic, Amy has a
money or make a loan or something, but he really shouldn't steal the drug-but
his wife shouldn't die either.... (fKhy shouldn't he steal the drug?) If he stole
the drug, he might save his wife then, but if he did, he might have to go to jail,
and then his wife might get sicker again, and he couldn't get more of the drug,
and it might not be good. So, they should really just talk it out and find some
other way to make the money.
Id. at 28 (emphasis added). In the rest of her response, Amy focuses on the relationships
between Heinz and his wife and between them and the druggist. In Gilligan's words,
Amy envisions the wife's continuing need for her husband and the husband's
continuing concern for his wife and seeks to respond to the druggist's need in a
way that would sustain rather than sever connection .... Since Amy's moral
judgment is grounded in the belief that, "if somebody has something that would
keep somebody alive, then it's not right not to give it to them," she considers
the problem in the dilemma to arise not from the druggist's assertion of rights
but from his failure of response.
Id. at 28.
42. Feminist Discourse, Moral Values; and the Law - A Conversation, 34 Buffalo L.
Rev. 11, 44 (1985) (remarks by Carol Gilligan).
43. See C. Gilligan, supra note 35, at 31-32; Feminist Discourse, supra note 42, at 38
(remarks by Carol Gilligan).
44. C. Gilligan, supra note 35, at 26.
45. Menkel-Meadow, Portiain a Different Voice: Speculationson a Women's Lawyering Process, I Berkeley Women's L.J. 39, 46 (1985). Jake's voice "values hierarchical
thinking based on the logic of reasoning from abstract, universal principles." Id. at 45.
46. Id. at 46.
47. C. Gilligan, supra note 35, at 29.
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more complex response to what she views as a question about practical
problem-solving: she tries to discover "not whether Heinz should act in
this situation ('should Heinz steal the drug?'), but rather how Heinz

should act in response to his awareness of his wife's need ('Should Heinz

steal the drug?')." 4 When she "fights the hypo," it is because she is
perceptive enough to recognize that the problem does not necessarily
present "a bipolar choice." 49 She resists the constrictions on option-generation50 imposed by the interviewer, and her option-generation is richer
to the extent that she tries to break out of the interviewer's preconceptions. This is a more common dynamic" in the practice of law than
seems to be recognized even in the literature produced by law school

clinicians.
Amy's option-evaluation 52 is also more realistic because she is looking
for what Gilligan calls "the inclusive solution":5 3 the one that addresses
the entire difficulty by satisfying the needs of all involved. By focusing
on relationships, Amy realizes that Heinz is not free of this problem until
the druggist is as well. Perhaps with some oversimplification, the end of
Amy and Jake's reasoning, as it would be seen acted out on the evening
news, would be Amy's announcement of the kind of fund-raising effort
that touches everyone's heart and wallet, while Jake desperately tries to
persuade jury and judge not to send his client to prison. And if, on different facts, these two "voices" were to litigate against each other, and if
Amy were to use her creativity aggressively, she would probably outflank
Jake strategically, despite his surer grasp of legal doctrine.54 Doctrinal
48. Id. at 31.
49. Feminist Discourse,supra note 42, at 51 (remarks by Carrie Menkel-Meadow).
50. See supra notes 19-20.
51. For example,
[a] lawyer who came to my office... presented this problem to me as an attorney for a local bank. Where the signature card required A, B, and C to sign,
and C refused because of a disagreement with B, what kind of court order
would permit the bank to release the funds? Since any court proceeding is relatively involved and expensive (and ... since I had not the faintest idea what
kind of an order could be obtained), I suggested that we broaden the problem
definition to, 'In what ways might we obtain release of the funds?' [which resulted in] an effective method of convincing C to sign the withdrawal slip.
What turned out to be the best solution had simply not occurred to the attorney
because he had limited himself to the narrow 'court order' definition of the
problem.
MacLeod, Creative Problem-Solving-ForLawyers?l, 16 J. Legal Educ. 198, 201 (1963)
(emphasis added).
52. See supra notes 19-20.
53. Feminist Discourse, supra note 42, at 45 (remarks by Carol Gilligan) (emphasis
omitted).
54. This is a different conclusion from the one reached by Carrie Menkel-Meadow.
She argues (and I agree) that an approach based on care has been mistakenly undervalued
in lawyering. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 45, at 46-47. But the point here is that
even if care is not treated as valuable for its own sake, a voice that is too narrowly doctrinal can be debilitated in strategy.
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creativity is different from strategic creativity. 5 Each has its value, but
one is not a guarantee of the other.5 6
In a law school, however, doctrinal creativity is cultivated while strate55. Strategic creativity is much closer to artistic creativity, and not merely because
strategy requires an artistic ability to imagine. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
In research on students enrolled in the Art Institute of Chicago, Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi found that the essence of an artistic approach to a problem is the refusal to
accept at face value either a provided definition of the problem or a standard solution to
it. Instead, the artistic temperament reformulates the problem into a new and different
set of issues, see supra notes 19, 21, 24, 29 and 31, or envisions a problem others had not
seen. See supra notes 18 and 23 and accompanying text. Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi
call this "problem finding" to distinguish it from the more mechanical or bureaucratic
search for a standard solution to an already defined problem (a rote method of problem
solving). See J. Getzels & M. Csikszentmihalyi, The Creative Vision: A Longitudinal
Study of Problem Finding in Art 5, 80-81 (1976). Thus, it is not surprising that even as
doctrinal a personality as Lenin insisted that "an uprising must be treated as a work of
art." R. Payne, The Life and Death of Lenin 356 (1964) (emphasis added).
There is, however, some evidence that law work is especially attractive to temperaments that "prefer problems that are prestructured or prefabricated.... prefer [enforcing
rules and other] activities that are already defined[,]... like to evaluate rules and procedures[,] ...[and] prefer problems in which one analyzes and evaluates existing things and
ideas"--none of which are "creative and constructive planning-based activities" such as
strategy. See Sternberg, Prototypes of Competence and Incompetence, in Competence
Considered 117, 140 (R. Sternberg & J. Kolligian eds. 1990) (emphasis omitted); infra
notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
56. In addition, this material suggests the possibility that the general image of men as
better strategists is a false one: child-rearing practices in this society might actually tend
to handicap many men in this respect and give women more access to habits of thought
on which sound strategizing can be based.
On the question of whether Amy's voice is largely female and Jake's largely male, the
empirical evidence is, however, equivocal. Gilligan concludes that, while "most people"
are in touch with "both voices in defining [and resolving] moral problems," men tend to
discourse in a justice voice and women in a caring voice. See Feminist Discourse, supra
note 42, at 47-48 (remarks by Carol Gilligan). Gilligan's theory seems to be supported by
Piaget's comparison of boys' games, which have a "jurisprudential" quality, and girls'
games, where play is freer (although Piaget drew different inferences from the same data).
See J.Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child 13-108 (1965). Even though Piaget
valued the legalistic quality of the boys' games, other research has shown that play unstructured by rules is closely related to a capacity for imagination. See E. Klinger, Structure and Functions of Fantasy 347-48 (1971).
But other studies find Gilligan's distinctions to be less than clear-cut. See Brabeck,
Moral Judgment" Theory and Research on Difference between Males and Females, 3 Developmental Rev. 274, 279-80 (1983); Ford & Lowery, Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning: A Comparison of the Use of Justice and Care Orientations, 50 J.Personality &
Soc. Psychology 777, 783 (1986).
[A]fter surveying the literature on moral reasoning, empathy and altruism,
[Brabeck] concludes that sex differences in morality are at best minimal and are
not consistently found. She raises the question as to why so many people find
Gilligan's claims intuitively appealing and believe they speak to an essential
truth, even when there is no clear empirical support, or in the case of moral
reasoning, there is evidence which contradicts her claims. [Brabeck's] answer is
that we may be dealing with a mythic truth rather than an empirical truth...
[and] she suggests we may have some need to perceive males and females as
morally different.
Id. Even though Ford and Lowery's subjects "did not significantly differ in their use of
the two orientations .... they rated the justice orientation as masculine and the care
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gic creativity is largely neglected and impliedly discouraged through a
single-minded concentration on doctrine. This discouragement is actually not peculiar to law schools; it is common in education generally and
can be illustrated by what happened to Amy herself. She was interviewed again at the age of fifteen and asked once more about Heinz's
dilemma." Although she reiterated some of the concerns she had spoken of when she was eleven, her answer was the same one Jake had originally given-and at the age of fifteen she mistakenly believed that four
years earlier she had given Jake's answer!5" Not only had something of
herself been drilled out of her in the intervening years, but the drilling
was going on even during the interview that occurred when she was
eleven-an interview that was dynamically similar to many law school
classroom dialogues:
As the interviewer proceeds ....

Amy's answers remain essentially

unchanged, the various probes serving neither to elucidate nor to modify her initial response.... But as the interviewer conveys through the
repetition of questions that the answers she gave were not heard or not
right, Amy's confidence begins to diminish, and her replies become
more constrained and unsure. Asked again why Heinz should not
steal the drug, she simply repeats, "Because it's not right." Asked
again to explain why, she states again that theft would not be a good
solution, adding lamely, "if he took it, he might not know how to give
it to his wife, and so his wife might still die." . . . [T]he frustration of
the interview[er] with Amy is apparent in the repetition of questions
and its ultimate circularity....
orientation as feminine." Id.; accord R. Jack & D. Jack, Moral Vision and Professional
Decisions: The Changing Values of Women and Men Lawyers 5-12 (1989).
It may be that sexual stereotyping in this society-particularly the ways in which men
are trained to be inhibited about creativity and caring-has conditioned both genders to
treat as female some forms of conduct that in another society might be considered gender-neutral. See R. Pascale & A. Athos, The Art of Japanese Management 202-05 (1981)
(among Japanese business executives, extreme sensitivity to the feelings of others is an
indication of effectiveness). Even though it attacks hierarchical reasoning, the Critical
Legal Studies movement has more in common with Jake than it would like to admit.
Compare J. Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society 73-90 (1979) (endorsing Kohlberg's topography of moral reasoning) with C. Gilligan, supra note 35, at 2537 (questioning Kohlberg's framework).
57. See Feminist Discourse, supra note 42, at 40 (remarks by Carol Gilligan).
58. See id.at 41.
59. C. Gilligan, supra note 35, at 28-30. Whatever one might think of the result in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989), or of Justice O'Connor's
record in other abortion decisions, there may be a trace of Amy's voice in O'Connor's
desire to defer until another day the issue of whether Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
should be overruled. See Webster at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("there will be time
enough to reexamine Roe. And to do so carefully."). But although her theory ofjudicial
restraint is well-grounded in precedent and conservative judicial tradition, she was
treated by Justice Scalia to a prolonged and condescending ad hominem lecture punctuated with remarks that her position is "irrational," id. at 3066 n.*, and "cannot be
taken seriously." Id. at 3064. Some part of the future for this issue may depend on how
O'Connor responds to being treated as the scatter-brained female who got in the way of
what the boys wanted.
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There is no published research evaluating the effect of legal education
on a student whose creativity is primarily strategic, but one study has
reported that although "Thinking-Judging" students and "Feeling-Perceiving" students earn comparable law school grades, undergraduate
grades and LSAT scores, "Thinking-Judging" students were both proportionally overrepresented in law schools (as compared with medical
schools and undergraduate liberal arts schools) and more likely to graduate from law school and subsequently enter the practice of law."

II.

LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE PROCESS OF STRATEGY

A. Impediments

A number of problems confront the teacher who wishes to teach strategic analysis. The first is the custom of closing off strategic inquiry
through the kind of professional mystification described by Donald
Schon.6" Although a fair amount of the scholarship produced by law
school clinicians in recent years has been devoted to demystifying professional thinking, the clinical literature and student reading material still
treat strategy as unexplainable and indescribable instinct and intuition.
Clinical texts instead focus nearly exclusively on matters of technique,
tactics and lawyering style. For the most part, textbook writers have
tended to confine themselves to lists of tactical bromides, such as "encourage the deponent to talk and ramble,"6 2 "make the other side tender
64
the first offer," 6 3 and "volunteer weaknesses" in direct examination.
The result is a near absence of scholarship and pedagogy on the process
60. See Miller, PersonalityDifferences and Student Survival in Law School, 19 1. Legal
Educ. 460, 460-67 (1967). Since this study, however, events such as the rise of clinical
education may have encouraged a greater proportion of the "Feeling-Perceiving" group
to enter law practice.
61. See D. Sch6n, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action
289 (1983). Because lawyers and other professionals have not been able to codify the
processes through which they arrive at solutions such as diagnoses and strategies, inquiry
into those processes is muted, and the sources of professional superiority are obscured
behind labels like "wisdom," "talent" and "intuition." See D. Schin, Educating the Reflective Practitioner 12-13 (1987).
62. R. Haydock, D. Herr & J. Stempel, Fundamentals of Pretrial Litigation 231
(1985).
63. M. Meltsner & P. Schrag, Public Interest Advocacy: Materials for Clinical Legal
Education 235 (1974); see also H. Edwards & J. White, The Lawyer as a Negotiator 11241 (1977) (similar negotiation lists); R. Haydock, Negotiation Practice 125-65 (1984)
(same); M. Schoenfield & R. Schoenfield, Legal Negotiations 28-246 (1988) (same). Most
negotiation texts include analyses of negotiation theory based on sociological, psychological or economic research, and one text, G. Williams, Legal Negotiation and Settlement
(1983), is composed almost entirely of such material. But a description of the socialscience dynamics of a lawyering activity is not strategic thinking in the sense explored in
this Article. At best, the social science material is mere data that can be useful in a
strategic process that none of these texts explains.
64. See T. Mauet, Fundamentals of Trial Techniques 86-87 (2d ed. 1988). Even
though these are mere tactics, some writers call them and similar devices "strategies."
See eg., R. Haydock, D. Herr & J. Stempel, supra note 62, at 166-68, 227-37 (discovery
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of designing overall plans to control events (which many law school
teachers dismiss as too instinctual to be taught or learned). Students are
told, for example, what a cross-examination should accomplish, what a
good one looks and sounds like, and how to act one out-but rarely how
to create one. That leaves a large gap in legal education. Not only is

strategizing part of the essential logic of lawyering, but a student who
masters merely style, tactics and motor skills learns little more than how
to act out a lawyer's apparent role.
Second, the proverbial tedium and anxiety of the practice of law may
have an inhibiting effect on the process of strategy, and the corresponding tedium and anxiety of law school may have a similarly inhibiting
effect on the process of learningstrategy. In any form of work or study,
original solutions arise out of a state of "focused concentration" so enjoyable that the mind becomes completely absorbed in the task at hand and

otherwise dammed-up insights "flow" into consciousness without ob-

struction.65 This kind of experience is not limited to artistically or aca"strategies"); G. Bellow & B. Moulton, The Lawyering Process: Materials for Clinical
Instruction in Advocacy 508-86 (1978) (bargaining "strategies").
Three texts, on the other hand, at least begin to treat strategy as a process. See R.
Fisher & W. Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In 19-57
(1981); D. Gifford, supra note 8, at 13-70; K. Hegland, Trial and Practice Skills in a
Nutshell 167-91 (1978). In Jon Hyman's words, "fostering creativity is the key to the
Fisher and Ury approach," which is based on inventing "options for mutual gain." Letter from Jon Hyman to the author (Nov. 7, 1989); accord Hyman, Trial Advocacy and
Methods of Negotiation: Can Good TrialAdvocates Be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L.
Rev. 863 (1987). Two other texts-which are adapted from a single set of source material-try to help students understand something of the process of theory development.
See M. Berger, J. Mitchell & R. Clark, Pretrial Advocacy: Planning, Analysis and Strategy 17-33 (1988); M. Berger, J. Mitchell & R. Clark, Trial Advocacy: Planning, Analysis
and Strategy 15-35 (1989).
Clinicians are not necessarily in the vanguard of the development of process-oriented
pedagogies. The leading legal research text, for example, has inverted that field's traditional approach so that students experience research as a process, rather than as a static
set of expectations. See C. Kunz, D. Schmedemann, C. Erlinder, M. Downs, A. Bateson,
C. Greene & K. Millard, The Process of Legal Research: Successful Strategies (2d ed.
1989). That book ends in an "epilogue" in which four of the authors give separate and
inconsistent accounts of how each of them independently solved the same research problem, together with commentary that explains how the different approaches grew out of
varying views of professional work. See id. at 313-28. In setting out different models of
creativity, this challenges students to begin consciously developing their own creative
styles.
In contrast, no clinical textbook presently on the market contains varying accounts of
how different clinicians went about creating a cross-examination or a discovery plan or a
theory of the case or anything else that clinicians consider their subject matter. In fact, a
large number of clinicians-if asked to record their own creativity in this way-would
say that they cannot because these things are the product of "intuition," "instinct" or
"experience." See supra note 61. When clinicians themselves decline to examine their
own creativity, it is understandable that so many clinical students have so much trouble
developing creative independence.
65. See Csikszentmihalyi, The Flow Experience and Its Significancefor Human Psychology, in Optimal Experience: Psychological Studies of Flow in Consciousness 15, 3235 (M. Csikszentmihalyi & I. Csikszentmihalyi eds. 1988) [hereinafter Optimal Experience]. In a number of studies, so many subjects used the word "flow"-both as a verb
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demically gifted people.66 It happens where work is structured to
encourage it 67 and where the person doing the work is open to experiencing it.6 s The opposite is "antiflow": activity that is "meaningless, tediand as a noun-to describe this mental state that the leading researcher in the psychology
of artistic performance chose this simple and aptly descriptive Anglo-Saxon term to designate what would otherwise be referred to in more pretentious and obscure verbiage
(such as "autotelic experience"). See Csikszentmihalyi, Introduction, in Optimal Experience at 3, 8.
Although uncreative and even mechanical work is done more efficiently in flow, creative work cannot happen at all without it.
Because of the deep concentration on the activity at hand, the person in flow
...loses temporarily the awareness of self that in normal life often intrudes in
consciousness, and causes psychic energy to be diverted from what needs to be
done.... When the self is conscious of itself, not only does it become less
efficient, but the experience is usually painful.... [But when truly challenged],
people actually report experiencing a transcendence of self .... The climber
[for instance] feels at one with the mountain ....
...Irrelevant thoughts, worries, distractions no longer have a chance to appear in consciousness .... Self-consciousness, or the worry we so often have
about how we appear in the eyes of others, also disappears for the same reason.... [Instead,] there is a great inner clarity [and thinking teaches a heightened state that] is logically coherent and purposeful.
Csikszentmihalyi, The Flow Experience and Its Significance for Human Psychology,
supra, at 33-34 (citation omitted). In other words, thought flows without obstruction into
action. A person in this state "simply does not have enough attention left to think about
anything else," even the passage of time. See id. at 32. This experience is so pleasurable
that people fluent with it "will attempt to replicate it whenever possible," id. at 34, and
will not cheerfully tolerate interruption. "The experience of enjoyment is one of personal
control, but it is also one in which actions seem to be effortless ...[without] the sensation
of effort and strain." Larson, Flow and Writing, in Optimal Experience 150, 166.
For people who work predominantly in flow, the dichotomy between work and play
becomes meaningless because they experience at least as much fun in work as they do in
the activities that are arbitrarily classified as recreation. On the other hand, people whose
motivations are primarily extrinsic (security, money, power, fame) are frequently alienated from their work and do it at best only with grudging diligence, not with creativity.
See M. Csikszentmihalyi, Beyond Boredom and Anxiety 3-4 (1975).
66. See Delle Fave & Massimini, Modernizationand the ChangingContexts of Flow in
Work and Leisure, in Optimal Experience, supra note 65, at 196-98 (farmers in a traditional rural village in Italy report being in flow almost continually throughout the work
day).
67. The research suggests that a person can experience flow only when he or she fully
comprehends the ultimate goals to be accomplished, when the task presents a challenge
that is heightened but not beyond the person's skills or capacity to grow and when he or
she knows that the surrounding environment will respond to the quality of the action
taken. See Csikszentmihalyi, The Flow Experience and Its Significancefor Human Psychology, supra note 65, at 30-34. Flow "typically occurs in... games, sports, or artistic
performances"--or in other activities that can be transformed into games or artistryand where "the level of challenges and skills can be varied and controlled" by the person
in flow. See id. at 30-31.
Any form of tedium or anxiety will interfere with flow. "Surgeons who repeatedly
perform the same operations, such as appendectomies, quickly become bored with their
work. Academic surgeons who do state-of-the-art operations report experiencing flow as
intense as any artist or sportsman." Id. at 31; see also M. Csikszentmihalyi, Beyond
Boredom, supra note 65, at 123-39 (surgery as a form of challenging play).
68. See Csikszentmihalyi, Introduction, supra note 65, at 6. Flow happens more eas-
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ous ... [and] offers little challenge; is not intrinsically motivating; and
creates a sense of lack of control., 69 For many lawyers and law students,
these very characteristics-boredom and stress-dominate the work they
are asked to do."°
A third problem is the paradox that professional thinking can be explained only in language understandable to a person who already knows
how to think like a professional. Thuls, to learn how to think professionally, students must "plunge into doing-without knowing, in essential
ways, what [they need] to learn,"'" and "exhibit[ing], in order to learn,
that which they most need to learn." 7 2 Although some students enter
such a mystery confident that they can eventually "break it open," 73 the
greater number are more comfortable treating a teacher's comments as
"a set of expert procedures to be followed mechanically in each situation " 7 4 -which is not an effective way to solve the types of problems that
ily to people who feel that they "own" their behavior: they are in control of what they
do, and they do not care-or need to care-about whether others approve. See id. Flow
also depends on an "ability to create enjoyment" through "internal self-regulation." Larson, Flow and Writing, supra note 65, at 167. Research suggests that the more "modern"
one's work and attitude toward work, the less one is able to experience flow, with the
result that flow may be becoming less and less common among young people. See Delle
Fave & Massimini, supra note 66, at 204-05.
Flow is "enjoyable for its own sake" and causes effectiveness only as a by-product. See
Rathunde, Optimal Experience and the Family Context, in Optimal Experience, supra
note 65, at 343; see also M. Csikszentmihalyi, Beyond Boredom, supra note 65, at 179-206
(arbitrariness of distinction between work and play). Flow increases performance only
for people who can experience it spontaneously, without an extraneous offer of reward or
threat of punishment. A person whose motivations are primarily geared to the expectations of others will not experience flow frequently, and that person's performance cannot
be improved by efforts to encourage flow through positive or negative reinforcement. See
Csikszentmihalyi, The Future of Flow, in OptimalExperience, supra note 65, at 374. Nor
will it be improved substantially through intimidation based on guilt or shame.
69. Allison & Duncan, Women, Work and Flow, in Optimal Experience, supra note
65, at 120. "[T]he most urgent applications of the flow model [are] in schools and on the
job, where most people spend most of their lives--often in boredom or in states of uneasy
anxiety." Csikszentmihalyi, Introduction,supra note 65, at 12.
70. See D. Arron, Running From the Law: Why Good Lawyers are Getting Out of
the Legal Profession passim (1989); Oppenheimer, The Proletarianizationof the Professional, 20 Soc. Rev. Monographs 213, passim (1973). Law work is not usually treated as
an activity that can be structured to enhance the creativity of those who undertake it.
When courts devise systems of procedural rules, when law firms and other employers
structure attorneys' work and when law faculties design and redesign curricula, virtually
no thought is given to the deadening effect on creativity of what lawyers and law students
are thereby asked to do. In fact, much of the practice and study of law inhibits flow in
the same way that assembly-line work in a factory does. Although physicians make similar complaints (especially during their hospital residencies), a physician in private practice-or an architect or even a self-employed auto mechanic-is in far greater control
over how work is to be done, how time is to be used and the environment in which all this
transpires.
71. D. Schbn, Educating,supra note 61, at 166.
72. Id. at 139.
73. Id. at 125.
74. Id. at 155. Law school teachers often note the increase in student vocationalism
and in resistance to assigned work requiring reflection. See, e.g., Panel Discussion on
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confront legal professionals. This kind of literalism is often supplemented with empty mimicry of the "moves" that students think lawyers
75
make and the social masks that they see lawyers wear.
A fourth problem is the effect of students' backgrounds. Most students have very little experience causing difficult things to happen, making important decisions on behalf of other people or analyzing their own
decisions. They thus come to law school without much decisiveness,
sense of calculating risk or understanding of complex decision-making.
Much of education, even legal education, conditions students to ignore or
even distrust their own capacities for originality;7 6 to think in terms of a
hierarchy of rights, rather than a methodology of problem-solving; 77 and
78
to approach problems and decision-making in a mood of passivity.
Clinical Legal Education: Reflections on the Past Fifteen Years and Aspirationsfor the
Future, 36 Cath. U.L. Rev. 337, 344, 357 (1987) (law students have narrow learning goals
and resist clinical literature requiring reflection) (comments by Philip Schrag); D'Amato,
The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism, 37 J. Legal
Educ. 461, 467-69, 477 (1987) (comparing effectiveness of different teaching modes). But
see Panel Discussion,supra, at 351-52, 357 (Critical Legal Studies teachers are more successful in getting students interested in philosophical discourse) (comments by Elliott
Milstein, Leah Wortham and Philip Schrag). Increased or not, student vocationalism is
not necessarily an impediment to teaching strategic analysis. In fact, where an overly
vocational student can come to feel the weight of responsibility for solving a problem, the
gap between teacher and student might be narrowed through dialogues that contemporaneously coach the process of creation. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. These
kinds of dialogues might not, however, reach the kind of student that Carrington and
Conley call "alienated." See Carrington & Conley, Correspondence- Negative Attitudes
of Law Students: A Replication of the Alienation and DissatisfactionFactors, 76 Mich. L
Rev. 1036, 1036-41 (1978); Carrington & Conley, The Alienation of Law Students, 75
Mich. L. Rev. 887, 889-91 (1977).
75. See Neumann, supra note 19, at 753-58.
76. See Fuller, On Teaching Law, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 35, 43 (1950). Lon Fuller believed
that creativity does not easily happen in a mind "that is oriented toward examinations...
[and] has to ask itself anxiously at every turn that most inhibitive of questions, 'What will
otherpeople think?"' Id. (emphasis added). The "fear of making a fool of yourself," K.
Hegland, supra note 64, at 181, is one of the biggest blocks to creativity. It is certainly a
block that can be cemented in place by the law school experience. The empirical research
on how the fear of failure and pressures to conform debilitate creativity is summarized in
T. Amabile, supra note 19, at 74-75, 160, 196-97 and Torrance, Education and Creativity,
in Creativity: Progress and Potential 98-100 (C. Taylor ed. 1964).
The evidence is mixed about the sources of law school pressures to conform and related
stress. Some have blamed law school faculties and curricula. See Savoy, Toward A New
Politics Of Legal Education, 79 Yale L.J. 444, 455-62, 480-87 (1970); Watson, The Quest
For Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects Of Legal Education, 37 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 91, 109-10, 121-22 (1968). Others have suggested that students inflict much of it on
themselves and on each other. See Carrington & Conley, Correspondence - Negative
Attitudes, supra note 74, at 1043; Carrington & Conley, Alienation, supra note 74, at 894;
Watson, supra, at 105-06, 119-20. Still others have argued that stress is inherent in a
professional education. See Taylor, Law School Stress and the "DeformationProfessionelle" 27 J. Legal Educ. 251, 253-54 (1975). In fact, all of these sources may contribute to
an atmosphere discouraging creativity in law school. See Heins, Fahey & Henderson,
Law Students and Medical Students: A Comparison of PerceivedStress, 33 J. Legal Educ.
511, 523-25 (1983).
77. See supra notes 34 and 41-60 and accompanying text.
78. Although one rarely hears students speak the words "fate" and "luck," the con-
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Moreover, instruction in strategic analysis represents an abrupt change
in a student's legal education. Doctrinal analysis and rule memorization
are only a small part of strategic thinking. A doctrinally gifted student
may lack the creativity needed for strategy,79 while a doctrinally average
student may turn out to be a very effective strategist.80
Fifth, when students begin to strategize, they are enveloped in a procedural fog that blinds them, because of their inexperience with the opera-

tion of rules of evidence and procedure, with burdens of production and
persuasion, with the judicial personality (individually and generically),
with the folklore of jury behavior and with the courthouse bureaucracy's
habits of operation. The pedagogical difficulty is to integrate all these
considerations into the strategic process so that students can learn to
think about procedure strategically. 8"
A final problem is the difficulty of analyzing the process of creating a
strategy after it has occurred. A lawyer or a student may be able to
explain a strategy's logic but retreat into frustration and inarticulateness
when asked to describe the process through which it was arrived at, even
though it is mastery of the process that produces a superior strategist.
Because creative work continually wanders into and out of consciousness, it should not be surprising when a person, particulaily one who is
inexperienced in formulating strategy, is unable to remember and reduce
82
to language the complex chain of association that has led to a strategy.
cepts behind those words dominate the thinking of a student who prepares for a motion
or court appearance believing that, although a show of persuasiveness should be made for
the sake of appearances, in the end the issue will be decided on the basis of "whatever the
judge wants to do." This is certainly the opposite of the capacity to "bring the enemy to
the field of battle and.., not [be] brought there by him." Sun-tzu, supra note 15, at ch. 6,
verse 2. In teaching students how to make decisions, a fair amount of a teacher's effort is
spent overcoming the passivity induced by many years of classroom instruction-including law school doctrinal instruction.
79. Although "a certain amount of intelligence is required for creativity .... intelligence and creativity are by no means synonymous." J. Getzels & P. Jackson, supra note
29, at 125. Many people become skilled at playing the role of a student through testtaking techniques and mimicry of teachers but have limited capacities for-and perhaps
fear of-independent thought.
80. Creativity is an everyday characteristic that is not limited to people who are "brilliant" or have artistic temperaments. See J. Getzels & P. Jackson, supra note 29, at 6-7,
125; T. Amabile, supra note 19, at 84. In general, creativity is less common in societies
where entertainment tends to be passive, organizations are predominantly hierarchical,
life is thought of as a career and conformity is important to career advancement.
81. One way to overcome this problem is to use a sequence of study that helps students walk into the fog gradually. A teacher might begin with a seminar exercise stripped
of procedural rules, such as the task of developing a theory on behalf of a person who
must testify before a Congressional committee and whose business will suffer if regulatory
legislation is enacted. In a second exercise, on different facts, the teacher might explain
the effect of all the relevant procedural rules and dynamics and then ask the seminar to
build a strategy based on that data. These exercises could lead into case work with clients, a semester-long simulation or a third exercise in which the teacher simply lists the
relevant rules and asks the seminar to make a strategy.
82. See supra note 19.
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In fact, because imagination and memory are inseparable, 3 much of
what a student "remembers" in such circumstances may instead be retrospectively imagined, and neither student nor teacher is capable of telling
the difference.
Moreover, even when a student is able to speak with at least some
clarity (and perhaps originality) -about the creation of a strategy, the
teacher might not be willing to hear what is being said. A teacher who
does not understand creativity might expect to hear only fully formed
strategic judgments and might dismiss as foolishness partly worked out
strategies from which faults have not yet been expunged." 4 Or the

teacher might be willing to recognize creative work only if it is expressed
in language he or she prefers.8 5

B. Strategy-TeachingDiscourse
How can a teacher's discourse with students overcome these problems?

Classroom and seminar discussions have only limited value. The most
productive discourse would seem to occur in individual critiques of work
that the student has tried to strategize. But even then the most common
forms of pedagogy are not very productive.
Preliminarily, much critique consists of a teacher talking at a student,
who in response pretends temporarily to think whatever the teacher
83. See T. Hobbes, Leviathan 28 (Liberal Arts Press ed. 1958) ("imagination and
memory are but one thing, which for divers considerations has divers names") (emphasis
added); see also E. Loftus & J. Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony 75-85 (1987) (memory can
be altered by post-event inputs); I. Rosenfield, The Invention of Memory 83 (1988)
("memories themselves are generalizations that are constantly being 'revised' ").
84. The criticism of ideas as soon as they are expressed can paralyze option-generation. See Hallman, Techniques of Creative Thinking, 1 J.Creative Behav. 325, 325-26
(1967).
85. For example, in an attempt to learn whether successful betting at the race track is
a function of the skills measured by IQ-tests, some social science researchers interviewed
successful bettors who study the early version of the Racing Form for many hours before
placing a bet. See Ceci & Liker, Academic and Nonacademic Intelligence: An Experimental Separation in Practical Intelligence: Nature and Origins of Competence in the
Everyday World 119, 124 (1986). The researchers claimed to be frustrated because the
bettors (i) explained their strategies in ways that were "superficial or cryptic," (ii) could
not construct algorithms and (iii) "did not have vocabularies that could easily support
descriptions of their thoughts." Id at 128-29. To prove the bettors' inarticulateness, the
researchers reproduced the transcript of an interview with "a 62-year-old crane operator
with an eighth grade education." Id at 128. But the transcript proves the opposite:
although the crane operator does not speak in the cliches of behavioralist research, he has
an obvious ability to explain with plain Damon Runyanesque eloquence (and with a vocabulary that is more precise than the researchers') exactly why he has "the horse right
here."
It would not be surprising if occasionally some law school professors were equally deaf.
Not only do law school teachers speak in dialects of their own-varying according to a
given teacher's academic specialty and political persuasion-but clinicians in particular
are additionally subjected to the dialect of practicing lawyers. A student can sometimes
wander into this jargon-laden environment, speak haltingly of creative strategy and not
be entirely understood.
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seems to want the student to think.8 6 That is less a dialogue than a lecture punctuated with little applauses in the form of student comments
aimed at pacifying and impressing the teacher. Students do not learn
much from this, even when the teacher talks about the process of
strategizing.
In addition, after-the-fact accounts of how a strategy was developed
are inherently unreliable because of the inseparability of memory and
imagination,87 the roles of fantasy and the unconscious in creative
work,88 and the inevitable human tendencies to rationalize and self-justify.8 9 This is true not only after prolonged strategizing that might
86. See Neumann, supra note 19, at 753-62 (barriers to effective critique).
87. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 13, 19 and 65-69 and accompanying text.
89. Consider, for example, the following dialogue from an end-of-the-semester critique focusing on the student's theory of the case. (Generally, theory development is one
of the most important strategic decisions in litigation. See supra notes 11 and 20.) In a
semester-long pretrial litigation simulation, the student had represented a law school professor who complained that his university had wrongfully denied him tenure. (The huh's,
um's and you-know's have been deleted.)
Teacher: Did your theory change during the case? Did you start with a different theory from the one you ended up with?
Student: Oh, yes.
Tr: How did it change? What was it when you started out?
St: When I started out, it was all based on whether he was induced to take the
job because he thought that he was going to be guaranteed tenure or because there was some kind of provision that said, "Listen, once you meet
these criteria you're going to get tenure"-some kind of inducement almost like a guarantee, although not expressed, combined with the fact that
he had turned down other offers. So maybe there was something with respect to why he turned down the other offers. Then, as things developed
and I started finding more facts-for example the fact that he didn't consult the tenure standards until after his second reappointment-I started
changing, and then I realized that maybe this is a wrongful discharge, but
since New York [the jurisdiction in which the simulation is based] doesn't
recognize that, I'm going to have to file it under some other theory.
Tr: Breach of contract theory?
St: Right. So basically what I did was to say, "Fine, I'll just characterize it
and try to tell the court that 'Listen, in essence, even though it's labelled as
a breach of contract action, it's really wrongful discharge.'" [See infra,
note 91.] The problem with that is that it assumes she followed all the
tenure procedures. But the problem with my case-and the problem I had
structuring it and why I flip-flopped around in terms of theory-basically,
I had the same arguments, but the progression of how I was to make them
kept changing. I couldn't really figure out the best way to present all my
arguments. By the time I got to the memo [in support of his motion for a
preliminary injunction] it seemed to be decent, seemed to flow and be
logical.
This student clearly wrestled with the process of developing a strategy, and he makes a
valiant attempt to explain how, and why, he made strategic decisions. But despite the
ease with which he seems to loosen himself up creatively, once the act of creation is over
he has only the vaguest memory of what actually happened.
For a proposed approach to the problems inherent in such after-the-fact analysis, see
infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. (The dialogues reproduced in this Article were
tape recorded from critiques in a course in pre-trial litigation.).
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stretch over several weeks, but even immediately after a short burst of
creativity that might have lasted only moments. For the beginner who
has only the barest awareness of how his or her own creativity travels,
the trip may at times seem so mysterious that only occasional landmarks
glimpsed along the way can be remembered later.
For that reason, the traditional clinicians' "What-was-your-goal?" litany 9° does not help teach strategizing, even though it represents the logic
of strategy evaluation. In fact, because it is based on the logic (rather
than the process) of strategy, it encourages students to rationalize and
justify after the fact. With few exceptions, a litany-grilled student simply
responds with whatever ideas will best justify the student's course of action, regardless of whether the student had those ideas in mind at the
time the decisions being critiqued were actually made. 9'
It would be much more effective to free most strategy teaching from
post-performance conversations dominated by evaluation. If the teacher
is to help the student explore the process of creating a strategy, both of
90. The heart of the litany is something like this:
What was your goal?
What was your strategy for achieving it?
From what array of strategies did you choose this one?
Why did you reject the others?
What led you to believe that the strategy you chose would accomplish the
goal?
What led you to believe it would do so more effectively than the alternatives?
What risks did your strategy create?
In retrospect, did you make the best choice? Why or why not?
What did you do to minimize the risks your strategy created?
Did you do everything necessary to execute the strategy?
If you obtained the goal, was that because of the strategy and its execution, or
was it because you were saved by fortuitous events not within your control?
91. Although the method of the National Institute of Trial Advocacy ("NITA") successfully teaches the mechanical execution of trial tactics, it is ineffective at teaching trial
strategy. A better-than-average NITA critique might include a quick, cursory stab at
some portion of the "What-was-your-goal?" litany-usually abandoned after the critiquer has asked two or three questions. More often, the student is told something like
this: "Your theory wasn't persuasive. Here's a better one: .... And you should have
argued X and Y and should not even have mentioned Z." Or, after doing a cross-examination, the student is told, "You didn't control the witness because you didn't ask leading
questions." Later, after cross-examining a subsequent witness who is positively eager to
display his own repulsive personality, the student might be told, "You weren't using the
witness to your own advantage. Your leading questions kept him from saying the very
things that you should have wanted the jury to hear." This kind of critique is more than
mere custom in NITA programs: it is actively encouraged in NITA teacher training. See
K. Broun, U. Lester, M. Nelken, & J. Seckinger, Materials for NITA Teacher Training
Program 3 (1985).
In programs sponsored or inspired by NITA, students are limited to learning only
techniques or, to put it more bluntly, motor skills. They learn, for example, how to
execute a cross-examination, but not how to make cross-examination decisions. They are
not subjected to any systematic exploration of the process of creating a theory or a crossexamination or any other aspect of trial strategy. Analytically, the result is a cookbook
superficiality that ought to trouble law teachers, given the popularity of the law school
versions of these programs. For a proposed solution, see infra note 100.
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them will have to get inside that process at the same time. Perhaps the
most effective way of achieving this is through dialogues during creation,
in which the teacher prods and probes while the student develops strategy. In such a dialogue, post-hoc evaluation is replaced by contemporaneous coaching as one might experience it in an acting class, in a
conservatory of music, or on an athletics field.9 2 The following example
is a fragment from a much longer interchange between teacher and student. Although 93it has faults, it at least helps the student "feel" the process of strategy:
Student: I don't think it's in the cards that... [my client is] going to
get tenure in this school.
Teacher: Why not?

St: I've got one line of cases that say that a personnel manual can
imply a contract if it's relied on, and I think I can prove that
these tenure standards are at least as good as a personnel manual.
But none of those cases involves a professor coming up for
tenure.
Tr: So there's a gap in the law?
St: Yes.
Tr: Assuming that you're at your persuasive best, how is it most
likely to be filled?
St: I've got another line of cases that say courts lack the authority to
order a university to grant tenure. That's because the decision to
grant tenure rests on standards that are too subjective for a court
to do anything about.
Tr: And that means... ?
St: I don't think I can get a court to order the university to grant him
tenure.
Tr: Because the second line of cases fills the gap left by the first?
St: Yes.
Tr: And you will not be able to succeed even though the chancellor's
actions plainly violate the law school's by-laws?
St: Yes.
Tr: What's the most you could get from a court? Not what's the
most you're likely to get, but what's the most you stand a reasonable chance of getting? Let's see what we've got to work with.
92. Teachers tend to perform at their best when they and their students learn together, even though at different levels. Teachers are less successful when they turn from
what they are studying and "profess" about it to students. Some professing is occasionally necessary, but it has an inherent tendency to drain excitement from what students are
experiencing. When they are professed to, students stop actively participating in an adventure and instead start doing what years of formal education have conditioned them to
do: preparing to please the teacher by dutifully absorbing the teacher's thoughts and
words in order to reproduce them later at an appropriate moment to get the grade that is
a student's prize for doing that.
93. Unlike the dialogue in note 89, supra, this one occurred during theory development. This student also represented the professor in the simulation. Notice how the
teacher tries, among other things, to provoke the student to expand option-generation, to
explore alternative decisive events and to coordinate alternative strategies so that they
complement-rather than interfere with--each other.
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The most a court will be willing to do is order the chancellor to
transmit his tenure application to the board of trustees.94
Where it will be considered under which set of by-laws?
Probably the university's, rather than the law school's. That's
what the chancellor has been doing. And even if we get a judge
to order that she transmit his application, I can just imagine what
the board will do. We have no right to appear before the board.
She's in the room and we're not. They've been working with her
for years, and our guy is unknown to them, except that he's a
trouble-maker.
Would a court order the board to use the law school by-laws?
Possibly.
What good would that do?
Procedurally, no good because getting the application before the
board means the procedural violation has disappeared. Substantively, it means they couldn't reject him on the simple ground
that he hasn't produced a book. 95 But still, they could stand the
law school by-laws on their head and say he fails them anyway.
Is there a remedy for that?
No. A court will not order a university to grant tenure.
And that's what you think the board will do?

St: Yes.
Tr:

Can I ask you to forget-just for a few minutes-that you think
that? Just for this conversation. Let's come up with the full
range of possibilities of what they would do if presented with his
application. One possibility you've mentioned: that they'd play
ball with the chancellor. What else?
St: Well, they could consider it objectively; they could not be influ94. The university chancellor has refused to transmit the professor's application to
the board. The law school and the university have separate by-laws, which are irreconcil-

able on this point. The law school by-laws require the chancellor to transmit any application approved by the law school faculty and dean. The university by-laws permit the
chancellor to deny tenure on her own authority. The university and the law school also
have inconsistent tenure standards, which have never been tested because the law school
was founded less than a decade before. The chancellor appears to have followed the
university by-laws and standards. The professor claims that the law school by-laws govern and that the university has violated them both procedurally and substantively.
The professor's attorneys would have to persuade the court that the law school by-laws
and tenure standards imply a contract on which the professor relied. In the simulation's
jurisdiction, the provisions of an employee manual or similar document are impliedly a
part of an employment contract and will be enforced if relied upon by the employee.
Otherwise, there is no cause of action for wrongful discharge. (Although the actual case
that inspired the simulation is largely similar on the facts, see Faculty of CUNY Law
School v. Murphy, 140 Misc. 2d 525, 531 N.Y.S.2d 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988), aff'd as
modified, 149 A.D.2d 315, 539 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Ist Dep't 1989), the simulated university is
a private school and is not subject to any of the controlling statutes of the actual case.).
95. The university by-laws require publication of a book for tenure. The law school
by-laws do not; they even speak approvingly of using non-traditional scholarship in place
of doctrinal articles. The professor has written three law review articles, all advancing
the views of the Critical Legal Studies movement and all necessarily relying on nondoctrinal forms of analysis.
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enced by her. Or they could be influenced by her negatively:
whatever she says, they might want to do the opposite.
Tr: If they considered it objectively, what else would have to be true?
What would cause them to do that?
St: She would have to be a very fair-minded person, which we have
evidence that she is not-so that's out. Or they could be so fairminded that they would be able to pick up on her personal hostility to my client. But she's too smooth an operator for that; it
might happen, but I doubt it.
Tr: Or over the years, they might have seen her be reliable at times
and unreliable at others, and they might have learned to use their
own judgment.
St: I have no way of checking that out.
Tr: Not directly, but perhaps you do a little circumstantially. Do
you know their backgrounds?
St: Yes.
Tr: Have any of them ever taught themselves?
St: No, and I think that means that they're going to react the way a
judge would. They're going to say, "How do I know whether this
guy should get tenure? I'll have to rely on the opinions of people
who know better."
Tr: Such as the law school faculty and dean?
St: But the board hardly ever deals with them. She and the board
have worked together for years.
Tr: So, as you look at this through the board's eyes, she's the safe
and responsible person, he's the trouble-maker-and who knows
what this law school faculty [which recommended tenure] is up
to?
St: Yes.
Tr: Is there any way, in the board's eyes, of turning her into the
trouble-maker, making the law school faculty look safe and responsible, and turning the client into a victim?
[Teacher and student debate that possibility at length and agree that it
is unlikely.]
Tr: Let's step back and look at this for a minute. Is there something
that is reasonably possible that could happen and that would
cause him to get tenure? If there is, then you can figure out how
you can cause it to happen.
St: It's reasonably possible that the board might ignore the chancellor's views and grant tenure anyway, but it's only possible.
Tr: How can you protect the possibility?
St: If I can persuade a judge to order the chancellor to transmit the
application and order the board to consider it according to the
law school by-laws.
[Teacher and student talk about whether the latter should be accomplished through a preliminary injunction or through a summary judgment declaring that the professor's tenure application is governed by
the law school by-laws.]
Tr: Okay, he might get tenure. But you suspect that he won't.
What's the next best thing you can get him?

1990]

ON STRATEGY

St: He's in an awkward situation because, the way the chancellor has
structured this, he's using up his terminal year now, and it's so
late in the hiring season that none of the schools he's contacted
have openings in his field. He's going to be unemployed come
summer without much prospect of a teaching job for the fall
anywhere.
Tr: And you need to get him out of that position. What will it take?
St: It'll take a teaching job. I can't go out and get him one. I can
only try to help him keep the one he's got.
Tr: Let's break a teaching job down into its components. It's made
up of income, fringe benefits, the work of teaching, the status of
being on a faculty, and the use of the resources of the schoolthe library, the secretaries, the photocopy center, the gym, and
probably some other things I'm not thinking of right now. If he
gets tenure or another job, he gets all that in one shot. But if he
doesn't get tenure or another job, can you put it together for him
piece-by-piece for the next academic year so that he's protected
while he goes to the meat market next year?
[Student suggests negotiating for a package that would give the professor one year of unpaid leave, use of his office, secretarial and photocopy support, etc., while he seeks a year of employment in practice
with the enhanced status of being a faculty member on leave.]
Tr: Okay, let's call that your parachute goal. How can you get it?
St: Demand big damages, litigate to the hilt, then negotiate. In order
to minimize their risk and reduce conflict and controversy, they
might just be willing to buy him off.
Tr: Let's assume for the moment that you will be able to negotiate
that kind of deal, and if you get it, it would probably be because
it's nearly free to the university. Let's talk about three things.
First, is your client interested in that kind of thing?
St: I'll have to ask.
Tr: Second and third are related. Second, is your leverage good
enough for more? Since you've got them dead to rights on their
using the wrong by-laws, can you get fringe benefits for him or
maybe a lump sum payment?
St: That depends on the chancellor's anxiety-if she has any-over
whether the board might grant him tenure.
Tr: And third, will the parachute strategy interfere with the tenure
strategy-maybe by communicating that you're no longer serious about tenure? Or will the tenure strategy interfere with the
parachute strategy? You're considering causing or threatening
damage to get them to settle: what effect will that have on the
tenure application? Conversely, what happens if you start looking for a parachute after they deny him tenure? He wouldn't
look like a faculty member on leave next year, even if the university is willing to call him that. And would you even have leverage left at that point? Can you find a way to coordinate the two
strategies so that they don't interfere-or even so that they help
each other?
St: We're back to what the board will do.
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And the effect on the board of what you do ....

Although this type of dialogue might seem to be a familiar part of
clinical education, that is not really so. The version most often encountered in clinics is relatively unstructured and perfunctory and usually
impromptu. It often consists of the teacher's providing information that
the student has requested because it is outside the student's experience,
coupled with a few stray suggestions made by the teacher during the
discussion. And such a conversation is usually treated as though it has
no purpose other than to help the student get started on a project that
can later become the object of a post-performance critique, where the
real teaching is thought to occur.
But when it comes to teaching strategy or any other form of creativity,
the heart of the teaching is most effectively done not in after-the-fact critique, but in exactly this kind of dialogue, where the teacher can help the
student explore the process of creation. 96 For that to happen, the teacher
has to guide the dialogue through the entire flow-chart of decisions the
student must make, exploring each decision in detail-a method that
might be spread out over several lengthy dialogues that punctuate the
student's individual creative work. In doing so, the teacher's guidance is
necessarily limited to the process of strategy and to supplying information that the student cannot be expected to have already, while the student is left with both the freedom and the responsibility to decide.
Option-generation will be encouraged if the teacher defers evaluation until after the student has developed a full range of alternatives. These
kinds of dialogues are by nature longer, harder and more tedious than
after-the-fact critiques. But they are also far richer teaching.
Post-performance critique does, however, have a limited role in teaching strategizing. Although it cannot teach the process of creating a strategy, post-performance critique can help a student understand his or her
strategic strengths and weaknesses; whether an effective decisive event
was chosen; whether strategy was really organized around that event (or
whether the student eventually lost sight of it); whether a workable
linkage was built between primary and back-up strategies; whether option-generation has been rich or impoverished; and whether option-evaluation has been well-modulated or has instead been too weak (and
therefore uncritical) or too quick (and therefore premature). It can show
some uncreative students how little strategizing they in fact have done,
and how their non-strategy has forfeited influence over events. If postperformance critique treats the student's strategy as art created by the
student, it can touch on insights that the student might not have been
able to appreciate during the process of creation, that the teacher might
have had difficulty raising earlier, or that the teacher might not even have
96. One of the goals of such a dialogue is to help the student develop a method of
strategizing that best suits the student's personality and capacities for imagination, risktaking and so forth.

1990]

ON STRATEGY

recognized. The most productive way to raise all this might be to begin
by asking the student how he or she feels about the art work just created
and to97set aside-at least for the moment-the "What-was-your-goal?"
litany.

C. The Design of Strategy-Teaching Experience
In live-client clinics, screening cases for strategy-teaching value depends on a certain amount of luck. Cases need to be challenging and
strategically rich but not so complicated that they overwhelm students.
Few cases available to a clinic meet these criteria, and it is often difficult
to identify them before becoming immersed in representing the client.
Although some pedagogical value is lost when students are not confronted with responsibility for the problems of a real human being, students can more reliably be faced with provocative strategic predicaments
if the teacher creates a strategy-rich case and asks students to litigate it
on a simulated basis over a period of a semester or more.
To be strategy-rich, a simulation must have several characteristics.
First, it must give the student individual responsibility for making strategic decisions. Its environment should respond to whatever the student
does, and the student should make the decisions as an individual9" and
97. This is from a post-case critique:
Teacher. You've designed and built a litigation, as though it were a sculpture
or a bridge. You've lived with it for a while, and now you're walking
away from it. As you look back on the thing, how do you feel?
Student: I want to run over and fix it.
Teacher. Why?
Why does the "How-do-you-feel-about-it?" question evoke self-evaluation more easily
than the "What-was-your-goal?" litany does? Certainly, the "How-do-you-feel-aboutit?" question is less threatening, while the litany forces the student to put up a self-defense. But the more important reason may be that the question invites students to speak
(and think) of their own standards, aspirations and self-judgment, while the litany puts
them in the position of reacting to the judgments of others. See the dialogue reproduced
and discussed at D. Sch6n, Educating, supra note 61, at 143-50, where an architecture
teacher does not like a student's performance but keeps his opinion to himself. Instead he
asks "What do you think? Do you like it? What do you feel about it?"-changing the
subject in the student's mind from "What was wanted of me?" to "What can I accomplish here, and how can my teacher help me accomplish it?" Where a student is willing,
the result is the encouragement of creative independence. "The value of his product is,
for the creative person, established not by the praise or criticism of others, but by himself.
Have I created something satisfying to me?" Rogers, supra note 20, at 75-76.
98. Despite the fad for group "brainstorming," research on creativity suggests that
people are generally less creative when working with a group and that some people are
less creative when working even in the presence of others. See T. Amabile, supra note 19,
at 142-46 (summarizing the research). Full creative dialogue with one's self is possible
only in solitude. See S. Arieti, supra note 13, at 373; A. Storr, Solitude: A Return to the
Self 21 (1988). Nevertheless, occasional consultation with others may have some creative
benefit, stimulating option-generation, especially through mutation and synthesis, and
providing other viewpoints for option-evaluation.
Thus, the type of teacher-student conversation described in the text accompanying note
100 should be thought of as a "walk through" that avoids closure: the point is to show
students something of the process of strategizing. The conversation should end with the

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

feel in control of the decision-making process.
Second, a strategy-rich simulation presents "challenging situations requiring original solutions" 99 by putting the student in an unstructured
situation and inviting him or her to impose on it a strategic structure of
the student's own creation. That means presenting the student with a
large number of strategic decisions, together with facts that will support
a wide selection of courses of action-so large a number and so wide a
selection that ideally the teacher is not able in advance to formulate all
the effective strategies that might be available. If a problem admits of
only one or two "good" strategies, it misleads students into thinking of
strategy as a multiple-choice concept with "right" and "wrong" answers, 10 rather than as a form of artistic creativity.101
expectation that the issues have been opened up, rather than packaged and sealed. Additionally, seminar discussions of strategy in a particular case-whether simulated or
presented by a real client-may stifle individual creativity if conducted too early. Moreover, students probably learn less about strategy when they litigate a simulation in multipartner firms than when they litigate alone or, at most, with one partner.
99. B. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911-1945, at 124
(1971) (describing the tactical assignments General Stilwell used as an instructor at Fort
Benning).
100. The trial simulations currently on the market are particularly deficient in this
respect.
The use of canned problems necessarily places artificial boundaries on theory
development which are not present in real life. For example, students are limited in their choices to only a few (usually two) relatively obvious legal or factual theories. Although they must choose ...a theory, they are given no real
basis for doing so. Unable to interview witnesses, conduct original research, or
otherwise explore paths to meaningful theories, students are left to make their
choices strictly on the basis of inherent credibility or ease of proof.
Lubet, What We Should Teach (But Don't) When We Teach Trial Advocacy, 37 J. Legal
Educ. 123, 136 (1987). It might be better if trial simulations simply told the student what
theory to use. If law school trial practice courses confined themselves to teaching courtroom motor skills (a subject they cover well), theory development could be left to the
growing field of pretrial litigation courses, where it is less likely to be given the misleadingly cursory treatment that it receives in trial practice courses. See infra note 103.
101. When he took over the Infantry School at Fort Benning in 1927, George C. Marshall-who had a profound effect on the army both as a strategist and as a teacher, see F.
Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General 1880-1939, at 102 (1963)-issued an
order that "any student's solution of a problem that ran radically counter to the approved
school solution, and yet showed independent creative thinking, would be published to the
class." Id. at 256. What a contrast to the way so many law school classrooms are runl
"Any student who demonstrated unorthodoxy could be certain of Marshall's approval."
E. Larrabee, supra note 16, at 112. In this and similar ways, Marshall either taught
strategic thinking or taught the skill of teaching strategic thinking to approximately two
hundred officers who later became generals during the Second World War. See id.
Marshall was criticized for this kind of instruction, see id. at 111, but he persisted
anyway. The mentality underlying such criticism is a common and repressive force not
only in military life but also in many parts of the legal profession. It has some things in
common with the bureaucratic and uncreative approach to work embodied in the mediocre and average strategists described in Part IA of this article. "A professional soldier is
rarely a professional strategist. His [customary] training is concentrated on the mechanism of tactics and military organization, and in his peace exercises he is far more concerned to see that his own mechanism works properly than to upset his opponent's." B.
Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War 230 (1944); see also N. Dixon, supra note 33, at 159-63
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Third, a strategy-rich simulation operates so that, in the natural unfolding of events and without teacher intervention, it produces consequences proportional to the quality of strategy, rewarding that which is
effective and penalizing that which is not. "The student must see that his
or her actions cause something to happen . . .some consequence or
change triggered by the student's response . . . [and] the consequence
must flow reasonably from the action taken by the student."'10 2 This has
two benefits. It persuades students of the power of carefully crafted
strategy and of their own capacity to gain that power by shedding passivity. It also helps teacher and student diagnose the student's strategic
strengths and weaknesses by tracing-as far as memory allows-the extent to which the student's strategizing influenced events. A well-con-

structed simulation thus helps identify impoverished option-generation,
unskeptical option-evaluation, lack of strategic concentration, indecisiveness, and 3the other strategy faults described in Parts IA and IB of this
10
Article.
(cult of anti-intellectualism permeates the military, resulting in dearth of challenges to
existing practices). For similar emphasis on tactics and motor skills among law school
clinical teachers, see notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
In spite of this-and in spite of the cult of macho violence, the pomposity, the hardware worship and the indifference to suffering that one finds in the armed forces-military experience still has much to teach about strategic analysis. For one thing, the
conflict inside the military between true strategists and an uncreative bureaucracy is itself
instructive. More importantly, the amount of strategic thinking that has been documented and analyzed in military terms vastly exceeds that which has been done with
lawyers' work. Although the strategic incompetence that led to Flanders Fields in World
War I happens in small ways every day in litigation, it tends to be much more thoroughly
dissected when it appears on a larger and historic scale.
102. Harbaugh, Simulation and Gaming: A Teaching/LearningStrategy for Clinical
Legal Education in Report of the AALS-ABA Committee on Guidelines for Clinical
Legal Education 191, 214 (1980). "[S]tudents will learn best if the consequences of their
actions are revealed to them by the course of events, rather than as messages from 'on
high,' even if the result is somewhat painful or delayed. In most cases, the failure to
adopt a good strategy will be taken advantage of by other[s] ....and the student who
misses an opportunity, or who makes a false move, will learn significantly from the mistake." Schrag, Teaching Legislative Process through an Intensive Simulation, 8 Seton Hall
Legis. J. 19, 31 (1984).
103. In pretrial litigation courses, for example, injunction cases tend to achieve these
results better than damages cases, particularly where the judge is role-played by someone
other than the teacher. An "outsider" judge's rulings on temporary restraining order
applications and preliminary injunction motions are tangible and credible consequences
of the quality of student work. At the end of the simulation, once allowances are made
for the effect of performance skills (such as deposition interrogation and motion drafting),
the extent to which the opposing party's conduct has been controlled and the extent to
which the student's client has escaped control combine to form a fair measure of the
balance of strategizing between student and adversary.
With damages cases, something similar might be attempted by imposing an interlocking sequence of summary judgment motions and negotiations. If the summary judgment
motion is denied and the negotiators do not agree, however, the teacher must produce a
fantasied trial verdict to measure who "won" the pretrial litigation. Students understandably view that as an arbitrary teacher's trick rather than a persuasive demonstration of
the cause and effect of strategy. The problem is not solved by having the client give
instructions that the student "must" settle the case. First, the negotiations will become a
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Finally, a strategy-rich simulation seems so seductively real that,
rather than treating it as a game, students are pulled into its tensions and
treat it as a kind of reality-just as readers do when they find themselves
actually caring what happens to the characters in a novel.""° This resense and a certain amount of fiction skills on the teacher's
quires theater
1 05
part.
If the state of the literature 0 6 is a reliable guide to clinical teaching
agendas, it would seem that strategic analysis is not directly addressed in
much of clinical education. Certainly, the debate at clinical conferences
and at clinical section meetings of the Association of American Law
Schools tends to focus on technique, style and the appearance of a lawyering performance, rather than on the process of developing the strategy
underlying these characteristics. But if strategizing is at the heart of
lawyering, why is it undertaught?
New clinicians might avoid teaching the process of strategy because
the appearance aspects of lawyering seem to the beginner to be a full
teaching agenda. More experienced teachers might avoid teaching the
process of strategy for more troubling reasons. Not only is it simply easier to teach what the product should look like, rather than how to create
farce because it will become well known among students that those registering for tile
course "must settle." Second, clients rarely give those kinds of instructions at the beginning of a litigation, even though it is at the beginning that the student must make the
foundation strategy decisions. Although in real life attorneys must shift strategies when
clients decide that they have had enough of litigation, it is more important for students to
learn how to see the entire battle, at the beginning, and to conceive of a strategy for that
unified struggle.
An injunction simulation is effective in part because it is self-contained: students can
be expected to see the outlines of the battle at the beginning (although the contours will
change a bit later if discovery is well executed and if the teacher has properly designed
the discovery aspect of the simulation); the battle is large enough to challenge but not so
large that students cannot see it as a unified whole; and one need not wait until trial to
learn who is the winner and who is the loser.
104. This is hardly true of the wooden characters found in NITA simulations. Judge
Dixon, Trudy Doyle, the Potters and the other figures in J. Seckinger & K. Broun,
Problems and Cases in Trial Advocacy (2d ed. 1983) are one-dimensional and cartoonlike. And students understandably treat them that way.
105. "Theater sense" is the ability to cause an audience to feel the immediacy of events
as they are being acted out-something with which clinicians are familiar from trial
work. Fiction skills include, for example, the creation of characters and plot. Novelists
noted for realism generally say that they do not invent plot or characters, but instead
watch helplessly while their imagination discovers those things. See J. Gardner, On Becoming a Novelist 120-21 (1983) (a writer becomes truly inspired only when seeing tile
plot unfold as though in a waking dream); E.M. Forster, Aspects of the Novel 38 (1927);
J. Gardner, The Art of Fiction 21 (1984). Although the idea of fiction may at first seem
intimidating, clinicians may, as a group, be the best equipped among lawyers-intellectually and emotionally-to understand fiction skills and to use them professionally. No
simulation can lose artificiality entirely, but fiction skills can introduce a persuasive
amount of what David Barnhizer and others have complained is lacking in simulations:
"richness and unpredictability.... tension and.., subtleties of irrationality." Barnhizer,
ClinicalEducation at the Crossroads: The Need for Direction, 1977 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1025,
1048.
106. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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it, but strategizing is so difficult to understand and to explain to the un-

initiated that teachers may dismiss it as mysterious "instinct," rather
than as an analysis that can be learned. Even veteran clinicians might be
more confident of their knowledge of performance skills than of their
understanding of creativity and how it can be promoted pedagogically.
Some teachers may choose to take the path of least difficulty in the face
of student resistance to learning analysis, whether in the clinic or in the
classroom and whether doctrinal or strategic. And some may be deterred by the logistical difficulties of designing strategy-based simulations
or of screening cases for their value in teaching strategy.
But none of these is a sound reason for avoiding the teaching of strategic analysis. Although the process of strategy cannot be fully explained
to a beginner, it can be learned through guided experience and in that
way is comparable to other forms of analysis taught in law schools. In
fact, as long as it is dismissed as "instinct," even teachers will be limited
in their ability to strategize. Nor should issues of creativity deter a
teacher from taking on strategy: there is an abundant literature outside
of law on how the creative process works and how it can be promoted or
discouraged. 10 7 And this Article has already shown how, despite their

inexperience, students are constructively challenged by strategy-rich
cases and simulations: they quickly understand that if they resist learning to strategize, they foreclose for themselves the feeling of mastery that
they so want to attain.
III. THE MORAL CONTEXT OF STRATEGY
This is an Article about the process of strategy, not the uses to which
that process can be put. Perhaps a challenge even greater than teaching
strategy is teaching it morally-teaching it in a way that avoids deepening a mood of instrumentalism and amorality 1 8 and that reconciles strategy with integrity. But the disingenuousness and bullying that generally
accompany strategy in American lawyering-the abusive dehumanization of opposing parties and witnesses, for example, and the use of
107. See T. Amabile, supra note 19; Creativity and Its Cultivation, supra note 20, S.
Arieti, supra note 13; J. Dewey, How We Think (1933); J. Getzels & P. Jackson, supra
note 29; Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking (Gruber, Terrell & Wertheimer, eds. 1962); The Creative Encounter (Holsinger, Jordan & Levenson eds. 1971);
V. John-Steiner, supra note 13; J. Rossman, Industrial Creativity: The Psychology of the
Inventor (1931); Creativity: Progress and Potential, supra note 76; E.P. Torrance, Role
of Evaluation in Creative Thinking (1964); G. Wallas, supra note 19; Richards, Kinney,
Benet & Merzel, Assessing Everyday Creativity: Characteristicsof the Lifetime Creativity
Scales and Validation with Three Large Samples, 54 J. Personality & Soc. Psychology 476
(1988).
108. As Kenney Hegland has pointed out, the NITA method of instruction is, in this
respect, inadequate: because NITA simulations do not inform any of the role-players,
even the witnesses, of the truth about the disputed facts, the "student infers that all avenues of attack are open to him and that the only criterion for selection is effectiveness
with the jury," causing litigation to become "not a process for truth seeking, but a forum
for clever argument." Hegland, infra note 119, at 73.
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breathtaking litigation theories that are a quantum distance from any
reasonable best light on the evidence ° 9-are so remarkable that a discussion of strategy has an amoral quality unless it considers the effect of
such practices on all concerned, including lawyers themselves.
Defenders of these practices argue that they are required by the adversary system, 110 that the adversary system is the only satisfactory means
of achieving justice, I''
that they are a lawyer's way of becoming a "good
109. The work of destroying another human being is less troublesome if one prepares
by stripping that person of the things that provide an understandable identity-by turning the person, in other words, into an object. One begins by peeling off forms of dignity
that are otherwise taken for granted, and one continues by finding ambiguity in each of
the object's relevant acts and by attaching to the ambiguity an interpretation that condemns the object's intentions and character-regardless of the likelihood or accuracy of
that interpretation.
Because these interpretations are repeated articulately and with "sincerity," adjudicators and bystanders eventually recognize a possibility that they might be true, just as the
"big lie" in politics is eventually believed because it gains respectability simply by being
heard continually. And even where these interpretations are not actually believed, the
suspicion that they might be true becomes a factor-through negotiated settlements and
compromise verdicts-in resolving conflict to the detriment of the person who has been
converted into an object. And finally, in a feat of circular logic, the willingness of adjudicators to be thus taken in is used to justify the behavior that takes them in. For one
among many evocative descriptions of this kind of lawyer conduct, see Schafran, Gender
Bias in the Courts: Time is Not the Cure, 22 Creighton L. Rev. 413, 422-25 (1989) (the
New Bedford barroom rape case, the Chambers-Levin Central Park murder case, among
others).
110. In fact, the American professional literature is barren of any sustained inquiry
into whether these practices are inherent in the common-law adversary system. No published American study of the British, Canadian, Australian or New Zealand legal professions has ever sought to discover whether the abusive practices that are controversial in
the United States are engaged in by lawyers in those countries as well.
111. The literature on the relative merits of the adversarial system and the European
nonadversarial system is inconclusive, although abundant. See M. Damaska, The Faces
of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process passim
(1986); D. Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 50-103 (1988); J.Merryman,
The Civil Law Tradition passim (1969); Damaska, EvidentiaryBarriersto Conviction and
Two Models of CriminalProcedure: A ComparativeStudy, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 506, 555-78
(1973); Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Fact-FindingPrecision, 123 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1083 passim (1975); Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 734passim (1987); Kaplan, Civil Procedure- Reflections on the
Comparison of Systems, 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 409 passim (1960); Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 passim (1985); Luban, The Adversary System Excuse in The Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics 83-122
(D. Luban ed. 1983); Tomlinson, NonadversarialJustice: The French Experience, 42 Md.
L. Rev. 131 passim (1983).
An adversarial trial is a contest "between two theoretically equal parties who enjoy
considerable leeway to determine themselves.., the limits and outcome of their dispute,"
while the "adjudicator plays a largely passive, neutral role until the parties ask him to
render a decision." Tomlinson, supra, at 134 (emphasis added). A nonadversarial trial,
on the other hand, is more of "an official inquiry" in which the court "is responsible for
presenting the proofs and is not bound by the parties' positions when it formulates the
issues." Id. Its procedures "are simpler, less technical, and less lawyer dominated." Id.
Although some attempt has been made to test the two models through experiments with
simulated trials-see Lind, Thibaut & Walker, Discovery and Presentationof Evidence in
Adversarial and NonadversarialProceedings, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 (1973); Thibaut,
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person,"' 2 and that they are "so far mandated by moral right that any
advanced legal system" that did not approve them "would be unjust."
Walker & Lind, Adversarial Presentationand Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 Harv. L
Rev. 386 (1972)-this research has been criticized as methodologically unsound. See
Damaska, Presentation of Evidence, supra, at 1095-1103; Gross, The American Advantage, supra, at 740 n.22. One law school teacher has published a largely rhetorical "defense" of the adversary system that ignores the bulk of the comparative scholarship,
citing the Thibaut-Walker-Lind research but failing to mention any of the criticisms it
has encountered. See S. Landsman, The Adversary System: A Description and Defense
44-45 (1984).
With the research in this state, it is safe to conclude that "there is no objective or
empirical support for the proposition that the adversary system produces greater truthnot to mention greater justice-than any other." Lubet, supra note 100, at 130 (citation
omitted); accord Rhode, Ethical Perspectiveson Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 596
(1985). It may in fact be that we have an adversary system not because it produces better
justice, but instead because we have inherited it historically, because it provides employment for certain types of personalities, and because it satisfies a public appetite for verbal
violence.
112. Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060, 1060-61 & n.l (1976). "And why not [lie for clients]?" asked
Charles Curtis in an oft-quoted passage. "The relation between a lawyer and his client is
one of the intimate relations. You would lie for your wife. You would lie for your child.
There are others with whom you are intimate enough, close enough, to lie for them when
you would not lie for yourself." Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 8
(1951). Thus, a lawyer achieves a personal goodness and purity by lying for the profitenhancing conglomerate that the lawyer-out of kindness (and for money)-has befriended. See Luban, Adversary System, supra note 111, at 105-06; Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 487, 499 (1980).
It is sometimes thought that a belligerent or pugnacious bar is a bulwark against tyranny. See D. Rueschmeyer, Lawyers and Their Society: A Comparative Study of the
Legal Professions in Germany and in the United States 144-45 (1973). But in the United
States, much of the bar will abuse the weak as quickly as it will abuse the strong, and a
lawyer's abuse of the weak is a real oppression, not a hypothetical one.
113. Fried, supra note 112, at 1066. There are a number of advanced legal systems in
western Europe that neither approve of these practices nor could fairly be called unjust.
For example, in the United States, the pretrial "interviewing and preparation of witnesses
...is a practice that, more than almost anything else, gives trial lawyers their reputation
as purveyors of falsehoods." D. Luban, Lawyers and Justice, supra note 111, at 96; see
generally Applegate, Witness Preparation,68 Tex. L. Rev. 277 (1989) (discussion of issues
and problems inherent in witness preparation in our legal system). But a German lawyer
"virtually never [has] out-of-court contact with a witness," Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 111, at 834, because, under the German rules of ethics, a lawyer "may
interview witnesses out of court only when it is justified by special circumstances. He has
to avoid even the appearance of influencing the witness and is, in principle, not allowed to
take written statements." D. Rueschmeyer, supra note 112, at 143; see also D. Luban,
Lawyers and Justice, supra note 111, at 96-97 ("sever[ing] the search for truth from the
attorney's need to win"). And "German judges are given to marked and explicit doubts
about the reliability of the testimony of witnesses who previously have discussed the case
with counsel." Kaplan, von Mehren, & Schaefer, Phasesof German Civil Procedure1, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1201 (1958).
My observation two decades ago as a graduate student in Stockholm was that the
Swedish rules of ethics are not unlike the German, although Swedish lawyers tend to be
somewhat more active in the courtroom. Under Swedish law, the police must put together a case dossier that by American standards is voluminous; they must give a complete copy of it to the defense attorney; and if the defense attorney wants any further
investigation, he or she can require the police to do it. See Swedish Code of Judicial
Procedure, ch. 23, §§ 18-19, 21 (A. Bruzelius & RtB. Ginsburg, trans. 1979). A Stock-
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Not only are these rationalizations unsupported, but-like the dismissal
of strategy as "instinct" or "intuition," '1 4 -they are part of a structure of

self-justifying and reassuring assumptions that close off inquiry"

s

into

the more perplexing and disconcerting aspects of lawyers' work. It may
be that many American lawyers behave as they do not because of any of
the justifications usually offered, but because the American bar simply
reflects many of the least attractive aspects of the culture surrounding it:
a culture that enjoys belligerence and conflict enough to use them as a
preferred means of solving problems, 1 6 a culture so inured to the disinholm criminal defense attorney once told me that in 26 years of practice he had never
known a defense attorney's demand for further investigation to be unsatisfied.
In criminal trials, German law provides for three kinds of verdicts: guilty, not guilty
because the prosecution has not carried its evidentiary burden, and not guilty because the
adjudicator believes the defendant to be innocent. A defense attorney is ethically forbidden to seek the last type of verdict "if he 'knows' that the client is guilty." D.
Rueschmeyer, supra note 112, at 129. According to Rueschmeyer, although the German
ethical rules are stricter than the American, the gap "between official standards and the
standards actually viewed as binding by the rank and file of the profession" is actually
smaller in Germany than in the United States. See id. at 144.
No one has ever credibly argued that injustice results from the German lawyer's inability to be a deceitful and bullying "special purpose friend." To the contrary, "an eminent
scholar after long and careful study ...said that if he were innocent, he would prefer to
be tried by a [nonadversarial] court, but that if he were guilty, he would prefer to be tried
by a common law [adversarial] court." J. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 139
(1969).
German procedure and ethics are described here not because German adjudication is
particularly admirable, but because it is the "advanced legal system" outside the common
law family that is best documented in English. For persuasively stated reservations about
the German legal profession, see W. Weyrauch, The Personality of Lawyers: A Comparative Study of Subjective Factors in Law, Based on Interviews with German Lawyers
177-81 (1964).
114. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
115. American lawyers are very adept at using criminal law hypotheticals to shut off
skepticism about the morality of certain kinds of lawyer conduct. Criminal law hypotheticals, however, obscure, rather than elucidate, these issues because of (i) the peculiarities
of criminal litigation (particularly the effect of the Constitution on criminal procedure);
(ii) the role of criminal procedure in defining the general balance of power between the
individual and the state in any society; and (iii) the American bar's near total ignorance
of how criminal adjudication is handled in other countries.
116. We demonstrate that we are prisoners of our own culture when, for example,
American lawyers are "baffled" by the final clause of the typical Japanese commercial
contract, which provides "that in the event of disagreement both parties [will] sit down
together in good faith and work out their differences"-a procedure whose dynamics we
can barely imagine. See Lardner, Annals of Law: The Betamax Case, The New Yorker,
Apr. 6, 1987, at 45, 48; see also R. Pascale & A. Athos, supra note 56, at 127-30 (American cultural givens often "impedeo the kind of synthesis the Japanese manage so well.").
Although many forms of Japanese law were adapted from western models in the nineteenth century, the introductory text in Japanese legal education informs students that
much of the spirit of western law cannot entirely be imported into Japan because, among
other things, the concept of "rights" was unknown in the Japanese language until shortly
before the Meiji Restoration in 1868. See T. Kawashima, Nihon-Jin No Ho-Ishiki
("Legal Mind of the Japanese People") 16 (1967) (Fusae Nara has kindly explained and
translated this material). The central place occupied by "rights" and "entitlements" in
western legal culture is occupied in Japan by a complex set of duties. Where westerners,
in the event of a dispute, will think and speak of their rights, Japanese instead instine-
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genuousness of commerce and the marketplace" 7 that people-as in a
souk-do not seem ashamed when caught in falsehoods or manipulations, and a culture that evaluates a lawyer's persuasiveness by criteria
otherwise associated with hustling and hucksterism. It would take sustained historical inquiry to determine whether there has always been as
much intellectual thuggery in the American legal profession as there is
now," but it is a thuggery that scholars increasingly question." 9
tively seek to identify their own obligations to others involved in the controversy. See id.
at 32; see generally R. Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword 98-144 (1946) (discussing the meaning of "obligation" in Japanese society). But see F. Upham, Law and
Social Change in Postwar Japan 17-18 (1987) (litigation of politically charged issues is
not unknown in Japan). The result tends to be conversations in which parties preserve
relationships by recognizing and promising to fulfill their obligations to each other, in
contrast to the confrontational demands for vindication with which we are so familiar.
The next significant intellectual movement in American law schools may turn out to be
an obligation-oriented analysis that contradicts the conventional atomistic view of individual rights and prerogatives. Obligation-oriented analysis has already begun to appear
in scholarship championed separately by the left and by the right. Compare C. Gilligan,
supra note 35, at 64-105 (discussion of female concepts of self and morality in context of
abortion) with M. Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 50-58 (1987) (outlining the interplay of societal values and obligations in abortion issue). See supra notes 4159 and accompanying text. The government's obligation to behave properly may be more
important than the individual's right to have the government behave properly: our constant attention to rights may dysfunctionally shift the spotlight from the party whose
responsibility is really at issue to the party who can too easily be judged not to have
suffered enough. Moreover, rights-based rationalizations lend themselves with deceptive
ease to doctrine that protects the powerful from the weak, rather than the reverse. That
was certainly true in the long era that culminated in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), and is increasingly true of the Supreme Court today. See Horwitz, Rights, 23
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 393, 398 (1988). Finally, "duties precede rights logically and
chronologically." Holmes, Codes and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 Am. L. Rev. 1, 3
(1870).
117. In a recent study, 60% of Americans interviewed believed that "[m]ost people
will tell a lie if they can gain by it"; 62% believed that "[pl]eople claim to have ethical
standards, but few stick to them when money is at stake"; and 58% believed that
"[p]eople pretend to care more about one another than they really do." D. Kanter & P.
Mirvis, The Cynical Americans: Living and Working in an Age of Discontent and Disillusion 291 (1989). In terms of age, the least cynical interviewees were between 40 and 49,
while the most cynical were 24 or younger and 60 or older. See id. at 293.
118. American lawyers might once have felt greater ethical and moral restraints. The
first American collection of ethical precepts was compiled by David Hoffman, whose
twelfth resolution, for example, read "I will never plead the Statute of Limitations, when
based on the mere efflux of time; for if my client is conscious he owes the debt; and has no
other defence [sic] than the legal bar, he shall never make me a partner in his knavery."
D. Luban, Lawyers and Justice, supra note 111, at 10 (quoting D. Hoffman, A Course of
Legal Studies 754 (1836)); see also Shafer, David Hoffman's Law School Lectures, 18221833, 32 J. Legal Educ. 127, 127 (1982) (calling Hoffman "the father of American legal
ethics"). It may be impossible for us now to discover historically the morality of the
nineteenth century bar, but a number of nineteenth century lawyers expressed sentiments-such as "I do not consider it the duty ... of a lawyer to assist a scoundrel at
law"-which would be considered naive today. See Farmer, Legal Practiceand Ethics in
North Carolina,1820-1860, 30 N.C. Historical Rev. 329, 349 (1953).
119. See, e.g., Hegand, Moral Dilemmas in Teaching Trial Advocacy, 32 J. Legal
Educ. 69, 71-72 (1982) (moral dilemma in the NITA model for teaching litigation skills);
Hyman, supra note 64, at 872-77 (contrast between traditional fiduciary approach and
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American lawyers greatly underestimate the extent to which their own
personalities are affected by-and, conversely, affect-a legal culture in
which thinking is primarily instrumental:
Protracted engagement in ... practices [of deception] must leave its
trace on a person .... The moral damage to character that lawyers in
time tend to sustain... can vary in degree and kind. Persons of good
character who resort to the shady means of their trade while managing
to maintain a lively picture of the justified, ultimate aims of their vocation will no doubt regret their infidelity to truth and justice as well as
their unfairnes[s] [sic] to particular individuals. . . . Such persons
would suffer the strain born of the knowledge that ... their moral
integrity is constantly imperiled. Others who have less self-mastery
and a less firm attachment to ideals are more likely to ...

shift their

attachments to more immediate goods such as the wealth and status
with which society rewards the successful exercise of their combative
skills. Still different lawyers may... prize the acts of cunning, manipulation, and humiliation for their own sake. For them, the satisfactions of the profession consist in the
enjoyment of the spectacle of
120

others being subject to their power.

In a 1978 essay circulated clandestinely while he was in prison, Viclav
multidimensional approach to negotiation); Lubet, supra note 100, at 127-39 (criticism of
trial advocacy teaching); Postema, Moral Responsibility in ProfessionalEthics, 55 N.Y.U.

L. Rev. 63, 64 (1980) (lawyers should "bring... [their] full moral sensibilities to play in
[their] professional role[s]"); Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?": AttorneyClient Deliberation RegardingNonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C.L.
...

Rev. 213, 221-51 (1990) (providing a moral model for attorneys in the role of counselor);
Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clientsfor Economic Gain or PaternalisticJudgment: A Proposalfor a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761, 764-83 (1990) (criticism of
lawyers' deceptive practices that are rooted in economic self-interest suggests that a
"Golden Rule of Candor" should regulate the attorney-client relationship); Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1119-37 (1988) (lawyers should
exercise judgment and discretion and examine the overall consideration of "doing justice"
in deciding which clients to represent and how to represent them); Simon, The Ideology of
Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and ProfessionalEthics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29, 130-44 (criticism of mentality prevalent in professional advocacy that subverts values of autonomy,
responsibility and dignity).
120. Eshete, Does a Lawyer's CharacterMatter?, in The Good Lawyer, supra note 111,
at 270, 274-75; see also Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
Hum. Rts. 1, 13 (1975) ("[T]here are definite character traits that ... the lawyer must
take on .... What is less clear is that they are admirable ones."). The rationalizations
used to justify this situation, see supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text, can accurately be gathered under William Simon's evocative phrase "the ideology of advocacy."
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 119, at 30-39. However,
[i]deology is a specious way of relating to the world. It offers human beings the
illusion of an identity, of dignity, and of morality while making it easier for
them to part with them. As the repository of something... objective, it enables
people to deceive their conscience and conceal their true position and their inglorious modus vivendi, both from the world and from themselves. ... It is a
veil behind which human beings can hide their own "fallen existence", their
trivialization, and their adaptation to the status quo.
Havel, The Power of the Powerless, in The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the
State in Central-Eastern Europe 23, 28-29 (J. Keane ed. 1985).
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Havel argued that in a system of dictated ideology the obedience of any
one person helps prevent others from escaping the roles assigned to them
by the system; that "each helps the other to be obedient"; and that "everyone in his or her own way is [thus] both a victim and a supporter of the
system." 12 1 Havel began with the image of a greengrocer who unthinkingly displays in the shop window a poster-probably delivered with the
day's produce-that reads "Workers of the World, Unite!":
I think it can be safely assumed that the overwhelming majority of
shopkeepers never think about the slogans they put in their windows,
nor do they use them to express their real opinions. ... [This greengrocer put the poster] into the window simply because it has been done
that way for years, because everyone does it, and because that is the
way it has to be. If he were to refuse, there could be trouble. 122
As long as the only known method of living is the ideologically dictated
one, and as long as no one has seen any examples of living otherwise,
then no one knows how to live "within the truth."'" The power of the
powerless greengrocer was to stop obeying and thereby to stop encouraging the obedience of others, thus destroying the impression that "everyone does it" and that "that is the way it has to be."' 12'
Certainly, the lawyer who engages in bullying and trickery because he
or she is surrounded by other lawyers doing the same thing thereby helps
all lawyers "to be obedient" to the system of abusive strategy-a system
of which that lawyer and the others are simultaneously victims and supporters. If, however, this lawyer were to decide to stop being an intellectual thug and to aspire to the qualitatively different effectiveness of a
moral strategist, he or she would face profound difficulties. In an adversary system that is mistakenly assumed to be necessarily abusive, the accumulated habits of a lifetime would tell many colleagues, supervisors,
adversaries and clients that this lawyer does not understand "the way it
has to be." The accepted modes of lawyer discourse would make it hard
for this lawyer to communicate with adversaries or to elicit a moral re121. Havel, supra note 120, at 36-37.

122. Id. at 27.
123. Id at 40.
124. Id at 27. Not only does this analysis premise an argument in favor of moral
strategy, but it was itself a moral strategy. In the Czechoslovak uprising of November
1989, it was the decisive idea-the one that persuaded the public to rise up in the manner
it did and that caused the regime to unravel in the way that it did. See supra note 11; E.
Abel, The Shattered Bloc: Behind the Upheaval in Eastern Europe 49-70 (1990); T. Gar-

ton Ash, The Magic Lantern 78-130 (1990); see also Elon, A Reporter at Large: Prague
Autumn, The New Yorker, Jan. 22, 1990, at 125, 131 ("parable of the gegrrocer...

[was] a basic text of the revolution").
Conspiratorial and violent revolutions lead to the establishment of conspiratorial, violent and dishonest regimes. Something better usually results from revolutions conducted

in the open on the basis of principled strategies and tactics. Similarly, in lawyers' work,
the manner in which we win a victory becomes a historical fact that affects the situation

that follows, the client's appreciation of it, and-ultimately, after many such victoriesthe kind of people we are.
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sponse even from adversaries who might want to give one. And the returns this lawyer would obtain for clients would always be considered
suspect due to the unexamined and unproved assumption that an amoral
strategist could have achieved more in a quantitative sense. Some lawyers do succeed in becoming moral strategists in spite of all this. But
their means of doing so are so unstudied-and so rarely held up as models-that we know very little about how they succeed and how others
might emulate them.
In 1975, Richard Wasserstrom pointed out that we do not know
whether damage to a lawyer's personality is inevitable, and that the reason for our ignorance is that neither the legal profession nor law schools
has recognized the problem.12 5 Since then, only one book 126 has appeared explaining a method of lawyering based on principle, rather than
on fakery and force. The subject of that book-negotiation-is a widespread means of lawyerly conflict resolution that is perhaps least associated with adversarial procedural rules. 27 The next step-a very big
step-is to
develop equally principled methodologies of adversarial
128
litigation.

125. See Wasserstrom, supra note 120, at 15.
126. See R. Fisher & W. Ury, supra note 64, at xii; see also Hyman, supra note 64, at
897-921 (discussion of inherent conflicts between lawyer's dual roles as advocate and
negotiator).
127. "Amy . . . suggests not only different kinds of substantive solutions, she also
thinks of a whole different sort of process: dialogue between the parties," Feminist Discourse, supra note 42, at 52 (remarks by Carrie Menkel-Meadow) (emphasis added)-a
process all too often obstructed, rather than facilitated, by adversarial lawyers. See, for
example, Hyman, supra note 64, at 902-03, where a law student, disregarding some of the
most common customs of lawyerly negotiation, settles a dispute that lawyers had been
unable to resolve.
128. Anecdotal evidence suggests that at least a few such methods may already exist in
other common-law countries using the adversarial system. In the United States, for example, lawyers and law students are routinely taught never to ask the final, summing up
question on cross-examination. The standard and hackneyed cautionary tale involves the
cross-examination of an eyewitness who has testified on direct that the defendant bit off
the complainant's ear. During cross-examination, the defendant's lawyer establishes that
the event happened at night in a place without ambient light; that the witness observed
from a considerable distance; and that at the critical moment the witness's view was
blocked. Not satisfied, the lawyer asks the disfavored "one question too many": Q
"Then why ... did you tell the jury you saw my client bite off the other man's ear?" A "Because... I saw him spit it out!" R. Aron, K. Duffy & J. Rosner, Cross-Examination
of Witnesses: The Litigator's Puzzle 148-50 (1989); see also T. Mauet, supra note 64, at
219 ("[d]on't ask the last obvious question").
But British barristers say that they feel compelled to ask exactly that kind of question
during cross-examination because, if they do not, the adversary will argue to the jury in
summation that the cross-examiner never gave the witness a fair chance to respondimplying that the cross-examiner is a manipulative, insincere and untrustworthy person
who has tried to prevent the jury from getting at the whole truth. Although it is conceivable that the public's sense of fair play is higher in Britain than in the United States, it
seems at least equally likely that the conduct of the bar itself in Britain has led the public
to expect certain kinds of open dealings in the courtroom.
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CONCLUSION

Strategic mediocrity and even incompetence are widespread in the
legal profession, even though it is possible to identify the fundamental
principles of strategic analysis: concentration of effort on an hypothesized decisive event, planning from that event backward in time to the
present, generating the largest number of reasonable strategic options
from which to choose, accurately predicting the effectiveness of each option, shoring up points of weakness through sub-strategies, developing
back-up strategies in case the original strategy proves ineffective, handling masses of detail in ways that produce strategic coherence, thinking
in several dimensions at once, treating the entire conflict as an organic
whole, and so on.
Perhaps strategic mediocrity and incompetence are pervasive because
strategic analysis poses special difficulties for two temperaments endemic
to law: the aggressively confrontational and the narrowly doctrinal.
Although law attracts the former, a temperament that fulfills itself
through confrontation is the antithesis of strategic cunning. And doctrinal creativity is different from strategic creativity, which more closely
resembles the types of thinking found in fields usually classified as
artistic.
Legal education has difficulty teaching strategic analysis for other reasons as well. Both in lawyering and in the teaching of lawyering, strategic inquiry has traditionally been closed off through a kind of
professional mystification that falsely treats strategic effectiveness as the
incomprehensible result of "instinct" or "intuition" rather than of definable forms of analysis. Clinical instruction, where strategic analysis would
seem most naturally to be taught, has focused instead almost exclusively
on performance technique and styles of lawyering. Moreover, the study
and practice of law are themselves structured in ways that seem to discourage, through oppressive tedium and anxiety, the kind of mental state
in which strategic creativity flourishes: the focused concentration that
causes a rock climber, for example, to "feel at one with the mountain."
There are other problems, too. Among them are the complexity of explaining any form of professional creativity to those who do not already
understand it, the problem of integrating procedure into strategy, and the
passivity and naivet6 about the decision-making process induced by legal
and undergraduate education.
The two most prominent features of clinical education-post-performance critique aimed at evaluation of the student's work and field work on
live cases-are only partially suited to the teaching of strategic analysis.
Because of the inseparability of memory and imagination, students have
enormous difficulty reproducing their strategic thinking after it has happened. At the same time, if a teacher is to help a student explore strategic reasoning as a process, both teacher and student must get inside that
process together through extensive dialogues while the student is still in
the act of developing strategy. And even the best screened live cases
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present strategic dilemmas more haphazardly than well-designed simulations can, despite the latter's superficiality in other respects.
The moral problems associated with strategy remain, however, and
they are likely to remain long after we have come to understand strategic
reasoning and its pedagogy. A form of analysis and the conduct needed
to teach it can be elucidated through plain intellectual effort, but the uses
to which that analysis is put are determined by much larger-and in this
case darker-forces.

